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1 Introduction
More that 16 million people are estimated to have died because of civil conicts in the second half of
the 20th century (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Civil conicts are persistent: 68 percent of all outbreaks
took place in countries where multiple conicts were recorded (Collier and Hoe­ er, 2004). DeRouen
and Bercovitch (2008) document that more than three quarters of all civil wars stem from enduring
rivalries among ethnic groups that enter repeatedly into conicts with each other. Weak institutions
likely are part of the explanation, but are not the sole cause. Democracy, for instance, appears to
have no systematic e¤ect on the risk of civil war after controlling for other factors such as ethnic
diversity, GDP per capita and natural resource abundance.1 Moreover, several developing countries
with relatively solid institutions experience recurrent conicts, whereas some other countries with
weak institutions and deep ethnic cleavages never see civil conicts.2
In this paper, we propose a theory arguing that trust is a main determinant of civil conict, and
that inter-ethnic trade is the channel linking the dynamics of trust and conict. On the one hand,
conict disrupts business relationships among the groups involved. A thriving inter-ethnic trade,
therefore, deters war by raising the opportunity cost of war. On the other hand, trade hinges on
trust, since inter-ethnic partnerships (e.g., seller-buyer, employer-employee, supplier-producer, lender-
borrower relationships) typically go beyond spot transactions. By fostering trade, trust deters civil
conict.
We formalize our ideas through a dynamic model in which agents belonging to two ethnic groups
are randomly matched to engage in bilateral partnerships (trade), which we model as a variant of
the classic stag hunt game augmented with individual heterogeneity in the propensities to cooperate.
There are strategic complementarities: the proportion of cooperators in each group increases in the
perceived trustworthiness of the other group. Over time, beliefs get updated based on public signals
(and, in an extension, on private information acquired by traders) and transmitted across generations.
Finally, one group can wage war against the other, at the cost of destroying trade in the current
period. Conict undermines future trust by signaling to the victimized group that the aggressor has
a low propensity to trade cooperatively. Thus, a war today carries the seed of distrust and future
conict.
The theory yields two main predictions that are borne out in the data. First, civil wars are
persistent: each outbreak of conict increases the probability that a country will fall again into civil
war in the future. Imperfect and, possibly, incorrect learning is the source of endogenous persistence.
Second, trust is negatively correlated with civil conict. The causation runs both ways: war causes
1See, e.g., Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier an Hoe­ er (2004), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), Collier and
Rohner (2008), Collier et al. (2009), and Esteban et al. (2012).
2Columbia, India, Turkey, Sri Lanka and the Philippines fare relatively well in terms of democracy and other insti-
tutional indicators, conditional on their stage of development. Yet, they are prone to civil conicts. Interestingly, these
countries have a lower average level of trust than the average non-OECD country (0.16 vs. 0.22). On the opposite
front, Bhutan, Cameroon, Gabon, Kazahstan, Togo, China and Vietnam have low scores on democracy and high ethnic
fractionalization, but no recent history of civil war. Data on trust are available only for China and Vietnam among these
countries. Their average trust is 0.51, even larger than in the average OECD country.
trust and trade to plummet; conversely, low trust and scant inter-ethnic trade increase the probability
of future wars. "Accidental wars", e.g., aggressions initiated by a belligerent minority of a group,
or conicts triggered by exogenous factors (such as a lower threat of international sanctions against
aggressors) may lead to the permanent breakdown of peace (a war trap). War traps are characterized
by endemic conict and low inter-ethnic cooperation even during peace spells.
In the benchmark model, we introduce a number of simplications to achieve a sharp characteri-
zation of the dynamic equilibrium. In section 6 we relax some of the assumptions. First, we consider
shocks a¤ecting over time the groupspropensity to cooperate. Second, we extend the analysis to
a richer and more realistic information setting where traders acquire private information throughout
their business experience about the other groups type. These and other extensions show that war
traps is a robust result. In addition war cycles, i.e., periods of endemic recurrent wars followed by
more peaceful periods, can arise.
The analysis yields a number of policy implications. First, policies increasing the protability
of inter-ethnic trade reduce the incidence of conict. Examples include policies abating barriers,
such as educational policies promoting the knowledge of several national languages, or subsidies for
human-capital investments. Second, policies directly targeting peoples held beliefs may be useful.
These include educational campaigns promoting civic values and cross-group empathy, as well as
repressive interventions outlawing the di¤usion of hateful messages demonizing other groups. Likewise,
interventions designed to nurture and foster cohesive values (e.g., national over ethnic identity) can be
important. Credible campaigns documenting and publicizing success stories of inter-ethnic business
relationships, joint ventures, and so on, are other relevant examples. On the contrary, attempts
to impose peace through coercion e.g., peacekeeping forces or externally-imposed regime changes 
ultimately have no persistent e¤ects, especially if they fail to restore trade links. Forcing the separation
of groups may even be harmful, since such measures would stie any potential for trade cooperation
which otherwise may emerge during peace spells, and which over time may slowly restore condence.
These predictions are consistent with empirical studies in the conict literature, which we discuss in
more detail below.
1.1 Motivating evidence
We start by documenting that conicts are highly persistent. We construct an indicator of civil war
incidence taking on the unit value in each ve-year interval during which a country experiences a civil
conict causing at least twenty-ve casualties in a single year. The source data (originally at the
annual level) are from the "UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict Dataset" (UCDP, 2012).3 We use a panel
of 174 countries in the sample period 1949-2008. We run an autoregressive pooled logit regression of
civil war incidence on its lagged value. Table 1 reports the marginal e¤ects of the main variables of
interest. The webpage Appendix A provides the complete set of regression results.
We nd that a country experiencing war in the ve-year period t has a 36 percentage points higher
3This dataset has been used, among others, by Besley and Persson (2011) and Esteban et al. (2012).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
War (t-1) 0.36*** 0.22*** 0.30*** 0.17*** 0.32*** 0.17*** 0.24*** 0.10 0.24*** 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04)
Trust (t-1) -0.37* -0.56*** -0.48*** -0.46***
(0.21) (0.20) (0.08) (0.17)
Conflicts coded as war >25 Fat. >1000 Fat. >25 Fat. >1000 Fat. >25 Fat. >1000 Fat. >25 Fat. >1000 Fat. >25 Fat. >1000 Fat.
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample All All All All WVS WVS WVS WVS WVS WVS
Observations 1426 1426 1026 939 409 378 101 101 564 439
Pseudo R-squared 0.304 0.322 0.363 0.358 0.460 0.392 0.575 0.572 0.695 0.597
Dependent variable: Civil war incidence (five-year intervals). The dependent variable is coded as 1 if a conflict causing at least 25 (1000) fatalities is
recorded in at least one of the five years. Sample period: 1949-2008. Number of countries for which observations are available: 174. The set of controls
include: lagged democracy, lagged GDP per capita, oil exporter, lagged population, ethnic fractionalization, mountainous terrain, noncontiguous state,
region fixed effects and time dummies. Columns 5-6 restrict the sample to only the 61 countries for which at least one trust observation is available.
Columns 9-10 have as dependent variable civil war incidence at the annual level (details in the text). The table reports the marginal effects of logit
regressions with robust standard errors, clustered at the country level. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 1: Persistence of civil conicts and correlation between conict and lagged trust (frequency: ve-years).
probability of experiencing war in the ve-year period t than a country that did not experience war
at period t  1 (column 1). The autoregressive coe¢ cient is highly signicant (>1%). We see similar
results if we code as civil wars only conicts causing at least a thousand fatalities in a single year
(column 2). Since the persistence in conict could be driven by persistent di¤erences in institutional
or political factors, we add controls for a standard set of explanatory variables used in the conict
literature; see, e.g., Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoe­ er (2004), Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005), Cederman and Girardin (2007), Collier and Rohner (2008), and Esteban et al. (2012).
In particular, we control for an index of democracy, natural resources (oil), population, an index
of ethnic fractionalization, geography (i.e., the proportion of mountainous terrain and a dummy for
non-contiguous states), and the lagged GDP per capita. In addition, we control for time dummies
and regional xed e¤ects. The marginal e¤ects are a¤ected only slightly by the control variables, and
remain highly statistically signicant (columns 3 and 4). The results are robust also to country xed
e¤ects (see Table 2, columns 11-12 in Appendix A), which absorb the e¤ect of any time invariant
heterogeneity, consistent with the results of Martin et al. (2008b). Therefore, the result is not driven
by persistent di¤erences in institutional factors that make some countries more prone to war.
Next, we document that civil war incidence is negatively correlated with a lagged measure of trust
from the World Values Survey (2011). Trust is measured by the proportion of respondents answering
"Most people can be trusted" to the question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people
can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" (A165).4 This is a
coarse measure from our perspective, since it does not focus specically on the inter-ethnic dimension.
However, we expect it to be positively correlated with inter-ethnic trust. Lagged trust is coded as
the average trust level across all World Values Survey (WVS) observations available in the ve-year
4 In our sample, an average 27.5% of all respondents in a given country and ve year period declare that they generally
trust others (with a s.d. of 15.0%). Moreover, 23.2% of country ve year period observations experience either a minor
or a major conict, whereas only 9.7% of all country ve year periods experience a major war.
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interval preceding the interval in which the dependent variable is measured. First, since adding trust
to the regressions causes a major reduction in the sample size, we document that the results of columns
3-4 are robust to restricting the sample to the 61 countries in the WVS for which at least one trust
observation is available (columns 5-6). Second, columns 7-8 show that the e¤ect of lagged trust is
negative and statistically signicant (note that the sample falls further to 101 observations, since even
in the restricted sample of 61 countries there is an average of only 1.7 observations per country). The
e¤ect is quantitatively large: a one standard deviation increase in lagged trust is associated with a fall
in the probability of conicts of 5.2 percentage points for all wars (column 7), and of 7.9 percentage
points for big wars (column 8). It is not possible to run this specication with country xed e¤ects:
there are only six countries totaling sixteen observations that have both multiple observations of
lagged trust and variation in the war variable for the periods in which lagged trust is available. The
results are robust to exploiting the variation of conict at the annual frequency. In columns 9 and 10,
we repeat the regressions in columns 7 and 8 using annual variables, with two qualications. First,
lagged trust continues to be the average across all observations available in the ve years preceding the
observation of the dependent variable.5 Second, we continue to measure the lagged war dummy also
over a ve-year interval, since it is plausible that civil wars have a persistent e¤ect on the probability
of future conict that exceeds the one-year horizon.6 The results are robust: war is persistent, and
lagged trust is highly signicant.7
Most control variables have the expected sign (see Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix A), although they
are signicant only in some of the specications. Consistent with the literature, we nd that countries
that are oil exporters, and have large ethnic fractionalization, a large population, a high proportion of
mountainous terrain, and non-continguous territory tend to experience more conict. Democracy has
no robust e¤ect on the risk of conict. Its sign changes across specications and is often insignicant.
Although we use lagged trust as a right-hand side variable, we do not claim to identify causal
e¤ects of trust on civil wars. To do so would require credible exclusion restrictions that are di¢ cult
to nd. Moreover, our theory predicts that the causality runs both ways: whilst distrust increases
the probability of civil conict, war erodes cross-community trust. Evidence of the latter e¤ect is
documented by a number of empirical case studies. For instance, in a companion empirical paper
(Rohner et al. 2012a), we study the e¤ect of civil conict on trust and other measures of social
capital in Uganda. We nd that an exogenous outburst of ethnic conicts in 2002-05 driven by an
international shock (the US administrations change of policy against insurgent movements of the
5This choice is motivated mainly by data limitations: The WVS does not provide yearly surveys. We also considered
alternative measures of lagged trust where (i) we take the average over the past ten years, and (ii) we use only the most
recent available survey. In both cases, the results are robust.
6The results are robust to a number of alternative specications including (i) replacing the lagged war dummy with
a variable counting the number of wars over the past ve years; (ii) augmenting the specication discussed in the text
with a dummy switching on if, in the year before the observation of the dependent variable, there was a civil conict;
(iii) lagged war is measured over a ten-year instead of a ve-year window.
7 If we use a measure of ethnic polarization instead of fractionalization, the coe¢ cients of lagged war and lagged
trust remain statistically signicant in every column and of the same magnitude. Analogously, all results are robust to
controlling for diamond production.
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after the terrorist attack of 9/11), had a large negative e¤ect on trust. On the one hand, districts and
counties that were subject to more intense ghting experienced a decline in general trust relative to
areas where ghting was lighter. On the other hand, conditional on the extent of regional violence,
trust fell in relative terms for ethnic groups that were directly involved in ghting. Similar ndings
are documented by Cassar et al. (2011), who conduct experiments and surveys in Tajikistan after the
end of the 1992-1997 civil war. They nd that exposure to conict reduced signicantly trust within
local communities.
In our theory, the channel linking war and trust is inter-ethnic trade. While the e¤ect of interna-
tional trade on both civil and international wars is well documented (see, e.g., Martin et al. 2008a
and 2008b), it is more di¢ cult to nd systematic data on trade within-country between di¤erent com-
munities. However, the evidence from a number of case studies conforms well with the predictions of
our theory. We return to the discussion of the case-study evidence in section 7.
1.2 Related literature
Our paper connects to various streams of economic literature. The link between trust, social norms,
specic investments and business relationships is emphasized by a large body of literature on contrac-
tual incompleteness. The salience of this issue in the context of cross-community trade is emphasized
by Dixit (2003). In Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002) and Tabellini (2008) pro-social norms preventing
opportunistic behavior are key to sustaining e¢ cient trade.
Learning traps are related to the literature on herding, social learning, and informational cascades.
This includes Banerjee (1992); Bikhchandani et al. (1992); Ely and Valimaki (2003); Fernandez (2012)
and Piketty (1995). The connection with these papers is discussed in more detail in section 5.2. The
theory is related also to the theoretical literature on supermodular games with strategic complemen-
tarities (Baliga and Sjostrom, 2004; Chamley, 1999 and 2004; Chassang and Padro-i-Miquel, 2010 and
Cooper and John, 1988). While most of these papers emphasize the possibility of static multiplicity,
in our paper we constrain parameters to yield a unique equilibrium under perfect information. The
dynamic nature of the model of conict is related to Yared (2010). The importance of luck and the
persistent e¤ects of negative shocks link our contribution to Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997). Also
related to our research are the recent papers by Aghion et al. (2010; 2011) focusing on the relation
between public policy, on the one hand, and beliefs and norms of cooperation in the labor market, on
the other hand.
In a recent paper, Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2012) propose a theory of conict snowballs in which
mistaken signals can trigger conict between two groups. Their main focus is on war cycles, and
specically on how conicts that are not driven by fundamental reasons may come to an end. In their
model, as a bilateral conict escalates, aggressive actions become uninformative, eventually inducing
a group to experiment with cooperation. As long as the other group is not inherently bad, this move
can bring the conict to an end. Their model di¤ers from ours in many respects - in particular, there
is no explicit link between war and trade, which is the focal point of our analysis.
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Our paper is related more generally to the economic literature on conict. A set of prominent
papers focus on institutional failures, such as weak state capacity and weak institutions (Besley and
Persson, 2010, 2011; Fearon, 2005). In Besley and Persson (2011) the lack of checks and balances
implies that rent-sharing strongly depends on who is in power, thereby strengthening incentives to
ght. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) discuss the importance of inclusive political and economic
institutions to avoid civil wars. Poverty and natural resource abundance also have been found to fuel
conict, as the former reduces the opportunity cost of ghting, while the latter results in a larger
"pie" that can be appropriated (Torvik, 2002; Collier and Hoe­ er, 2004). The importance of ethnic
polarization is emphasized, among others, by Esteban and Ray (2008, 2011), Caselli and Coleman
(2012) and Rohner (2011). Some theories try to explain, as we do, why civil conicts recur. Collier
and Hoe­ er (2004) argue that wars increase the availability of conict-specic capital, such as cheap
military equipment, that can be used for further conicts. Acemoglu et al. (2010) argue that in weak
states civilian governments select small and weak armies in order to prevent coups. However, this
makes these states more vulnerable to insurgency and rebellion.
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the benchmark model of inter-ethnic trade
and conict. Section 3 characterizes the perfect information equilibrium, while section 4 presents the
equilibrium for asymmetric information. Section 5 extends the framework to a dynamic environment
where beliefs are transmitted across generations, and derives the main results. Section 6 presents a
number of extensions of the benchmark theory. Section 7 discusses some empirical evidence consistent
with the predictions of the theory. Section 8 discusses some policy implications. Section 9 concludes.
The proofs of all Lemmas, Propositions and Corollaries in Sections 35 are in Appendix I. The webpage
appendixes A, B and C contain proofs not in the text, and additional technical material.
2 Model Environment
The model economy is populated by a continuum of risk-neutral individuals belonging to two ethnic
groups (A and B), each of unit mass. The interactions between the two groups are described by a
two-stage game. First, group A decides whether to wage war against group B. Next, cross-ethnic
economic interactions (trade) occur. No economic decisions are made under the shadow of war. In
the case of peace, each agent in group A is randomly matched to trade with an agent in group B.
Trade is modelled as a classic stag hunt game. If both trade partners in a match cooperate, a high
economic surplus is generated, and each trader receives the payo¤ c: If both sides defect, each receives
d < c: If only one side cooperates, the cooperator su¤ers a loss, and receives d  l; while the defector
receives d: The matrix of material payo¤s is:
C D
C c; c d  l; d
D d; d  l d; d
Absent other elements, the payo¤matrix above describes a coordination game with multiple equilibria:
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C-C is a Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium, D-D is also a Nash equilibrium. Note that defection is
a "safer" strategy: If one player perceives it unlikely that the partner cooperates, she will go for the
safe payo¤ d from defection.
The matrix above describes only part of the surplus arising from inter-ethnic partnerships. The
total utility includes, in addition, a psychological component related to the compliance with existing
social norms of cooperation. The salience of such norms is assumed to be heterogeneous across
individuals and groups. More formally, we denote by P 2 R the psychological benet enjoyed by an
agent from playing cooperatively, irrespective of his opponents action. Then, the matrix of total
payo¤s is given by
C D
C c+ P i; c+ Pj d  l + P i; d
D d; d  l + Pj d; d
(1)
The heterogeneity reects the fact that individuals enjoy cooperation to varying extents. Agents with
high P exhibit strong civic norms. When P >l, the norm is so strong that the player would even
cooperate with a partner known to defect. However, P can be low and even negative, indicating
hatred, i.e., pleasure from inicting losses to a member of the other group. The distribution from
which P is drawn is assumed to be group specic: for example, a more clannish group may be on
average less inclined to cooperate with strangers.
More formally, P is assumed to be a continuous random variable, i:i:d: across agents in each
group, and drawn from a probability density function (p.d.f.), hJ : R! R+; where J 2 fA;Bg, which
is assumed to have no mass points. We denote by HJ : R ! [0; 1] the corresponding cumulative
distribution function (c.d.f.). Group A can be of two types: hA 2 fh+; h g; and accordingly HA 2
fH+;H g, where H+ rst-order stochastically dominates H : Since P reects the propensity to
cooperate with the other group, we say that group A is trustworthy (or civic) when HA = H+; and
not trustworthy (or uncivic) when HA = H . Instead, we assume that HB has a unique realization.
This is for tractability, as it avoids complications arising from a multi-dimensional learning process.
We denote by k 2 f ;+g the type of group A. Note that throughout the paper we refer to a groups
type as a particular cross-sectional distribution of attitudes towards cooperation, rather than as the
propensities of specic individuals (which vary within each group). Therefore, the assumption that
HB has a unique realization means that group Bs type is common knowledge, whereas group B
ignores whether HA = H+ or HA = H . It is useful to rescale some variables in order to simplify
computations.
Notation 1 Let (i) z  c (d  l); (ii) Li  l P i; (iii) fJ(L)  hJ(l L) and F J(L)  1 HJ(l L),
with J 2 f+; ; Bg:
Intuitively, z is the payo¤ di¤erence for a cooperator when its opponent switches from defecting
to cooperating. Li is the payo¤ di¤erence (including psychological benets) between cooperating and
7
defecting, when the opponent turns out to be a defector. The group-specic p.d.f. and c.d.f. of L are
simple transformations of the respective p.d.f. and c.d.f. of P:
Finally, we introduce a technical assumption that is maintained throughout the rest of the paper.
Assumption 1 There exists " > 0 such that the p.d.f. fB (L) ; f+ (L) and f  (L) are non-decreasing
in the subrange L 2 [ "; z + "[.
Assumption 1 requires that, at least in the interval P 2 [ (c  d); l], there are no more people
with high than with low civic norms. As explained below, this is a su¢ cient condition to guarantee
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the trade game.
2.1 Interpretation
The trade game with social norms, (1), is related to Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002) and Tabellini (2008).
We assume, as they do, that individuals drawn from di¤erent populations are randomly matched to
form business partnerships, and that there is individual heterogeneity in norms and taste for cooper-
ation. However, in their models social norms of good conduct are endogenous and evolve according
to parental cultural transmission. In our model, we take norms as exogenous and emphasize, instead,
the e¤ects of asymmetric information about a groups propensity to cooperate, or its trustworthiness
in the other groups eyes. Cooperation is inherently risky, and defection can be motivated by the
drive to play it safe against a distrusted partner. For instance, an e¢ cient partnership may require
one trader (the producer) to deliver goods to a partner (the middleman) in exchange for a deferred
payment (e.g., the middleman can be credit constrained and unable to pay the producer before selling
the good). However, if the middlemans group is reputed to be prone to defection, the producer may
refrain from entering into the arrangement. Due to the strategic complementarity in the trade game,
the public reputation of group A a¤ects the behavior of group B: if group A is perceived to be little
trustworthy, for instance, its members will expect that many agents in group B will defect, and will
themselves defect.
Finally, we note that the normal-form game, (1), is susceptible to an alternative interpretation that
abstracts from norms and psychological payo¤s. Suppose that the success of an inter-ethnic business
opportunity requires that both partners make a costly pre-trade investment (in physical or human
capital) such as familiarizing oneself with the other groups language and customs, or building an inter-
ethnic trade network. The investment cost is heterogeneous across agents and equal to Li  l   Pi.
When both partners invest, they can trade and earn each a payo¤ c. Otherwise, there is no trade and
agents receive a default payo¤d. In this context, cooperation and defection correspond to investing and
not investing, respectively, before random matching. The payo¤ matrix is observationally equivalent
to (1).
While in our discussion we emphasize the notion of trade, which we believe to be especially im-
portant, the gist of our argument extends to a broader set of inter-ethnic social interactions within
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countries. These can include inter-ethnic marriages, public good provision in villages and communities,
and more general situations involving bilateral cooperation.
2.2 Stochastic wars
We denote by V the net benet of war accruing to group A, comprising both the value of the resources
seized in war and any military or psychological costs associated with war. While, for simplicity, we do
not model explicitly the conict dynamics, V can be interpreted as the expected payo¤ of a war with
an uncertain outcome. We make the important natural assumption that V is a stochastic variable.8
Shocks to V reect shifts in a variety of factors a¤ecting the cost and the risk of military operations.
These include the amount of expropriable resources (or, to the opposite, the losses in case of defeat),
the internal cohesion of the group, the state of organization and morale of the army, and international
factors such as the willingness of the international community to impose sanctions on the aggressor.
An important assumption is that the realization of V cannot be (perfectly) observed by group B. For
instance, the state of e¢ ciency of the Soviet army after the 1936 purges was uncertain to its enemies.
Its weaknesses became patent (and even exaggerated) after the poor performance of the Red Army in
the Winter War against Finland.
The decision to wage war is driven by the comparison between the realization of V and the aggregate
trade surplus accruing to group A in case of peace, denoted by Sk with k 2 f+; g: Note that Sk
corresponds to the sum of all the payo¤s from trade obtained by the whole population of group A, given
the payo¤matrix 1, the distribution of psychological benets P from cooperation, and the proportions
in both groups of agents cooperating. Sk is endogenous and will be determined in equilibrium. We
will show below that Sk is bounded, Sk 2 [Smin; Smax]. Although di¤erent members of group A might
disagree about the desirability of war, depending on the individual realization of P; we assume that
group A has access to internal transfer mechanisms that compensate losers. Thus, the decision to go
to war weighs the expected benet V against the total opportunity cost of war to group A.9
Finally, to ease tractability, we discretize the support of the distribution of V, allowing for three
possible realizations, V 2 fVL; V; VHg:10 We make the following assumption:
Assumption 2 VL < Smin < V < Smax < VH :
Under the realization VH ; the net benet of war is so high that waging war is optimal, for any
feasible trade surplus.11 Conversely, VL corresponds to a situation in which the cost of waging war
is prohibitive, due, for example, to a strong international pressure or a failure in the collective action
8Our assumptions echo the recent literature that views the onset of war as "stochastic" (Gartzke, 1999; Caselli et al.,
2012), in particular due to stochastic shocks to coordination costs of rebellion (Collier and Hoe­ er, 1998), or to rebel
capability (Gates, 2002; Buhaug et al., 2009).
9A voting process à la Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) would yield the same outcome.
10The main results of the paper can be extended to a model where V is drawn from a continuous distribution. However,
the analysis is more involved. See Rohner et al. (2012b).
11V = VH can reect also a temporary explosion of hatred (Gurr, 1970) or the capture of the political process by a
biased political elite (Jackson and Morelli, 2007).
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process. We refer to the realizations VH and VL as a war shock and a peace shock, respectively,
with associated probabilities W and P such that P + W < 1. The intermediate realization, V;
will be referred to as business as usual (BAU). This state captures the situation in which economic
considerations, and in particular the state of the trade surplus, make group A swing for either war or
peace.
3 Perfect information equilibrium
To establish a benchmark, we rst consider the case in which group As type is public knowledge. In
this case, war spoils trade but conveys no information. We solve the game backwards, starting from
the trade game. Let nJ denote the probability that a random member of group J 2 fA;Bg plays
cooperatively. The expected payo¤ of cooperation for agent i in group A is P i + c  nB + (d  l) 
(1  nB) ; whereas the safe payo¤ of defection is d: Using the denitions of z and Li provided above,
agent i chooses cooperation if Li  nB  z: Conversely, agent j in group B cooperates if Lj  nA z.
Hence, the Nash equilibrium conditional on group As type, k 2 f+; g, is given by the xed pointn
nkA; n
k
B
o
=
n
F k(znkB); F
B(znkA)
o
(2)
Due to the strategic complementarity, the trade game can feature multiple Nash equilibria. Since
the mechanism underlying coordination failures in this environment is well understood (see Cooper
and John 1988), we abstract from it in this paper. In particular, Assumption 1 is su¢ cient to ensure
that a unique Nash equilibrium exists under perfect information. This restriction allows us to focus
more sharply on the dynamic interaction between belief formation and warfare.
The trade surplus accruing to group A under peace is given by
Sk  nkA 
h
nkB  c+

1  nkB

 (d  l)
i
+
Z znkB
 1
(l   L) dF k (L) +

1  nkA

 d (3)
= d+ z 

nkA  nkB

 
Z znkB
 1
LdF k (L) :
This expression has a simple interpretation: (i) d is the basic surplus from defection; (ii) z nkA  nkB
is the extra surplus generated by mutual cooperation, where nkAnkB is the measure of successful trade
relationships; (iii)
R znkB 1 LdF k (L) is the total loss (net of aggregate psychological benet from following
the cooperative norm) su¤ered by cooperators who are matched with defectors.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1 and perfect information, the Nash Equilibrium of the trade game
conditional on peace exists and is unique. Denoting by k 2 f+; g group As type, the equilibrium
proportions of cooperators are given by fnkA; nkBg as given by equation (2) where, n A  n+A and n B 
n+B. The equilibrium trade surplus accruing to group A is S
min = d+ zn An
 
B  
R zn B 1 LdF (L) for the
uncivic type and by Smax = d + zn+An
+
B  
R zn+B 1 LdF+ (L) for the civic type, where Smin  Smax: The
probability of war is larger for the uncivic type (1  P ) than for the civic type (W ).
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Since Smin < V < Smax; under BAU the uncivic type wages war while the civic type retains peace.
Hence, when group A is civic (uncivic) war occurs with the constant probability W (1  P ).
3.1 Welfare implications
The Nash equilibrium is generically suboptimal because of two interacting sources of ine¢ ciency. First,
conditional on peace, trade cooperation is ine¢ ciently underprovided. This result echoes the analysis
of supermodular games with random matching and externalities in Cooper and John (1988). In our
model, an increase in the proportion of cooperators in group A (B) has a direct positive externality
on group B (A). Moreover, by inducing more agents in group B (A) to cooperate, it has a benecial
feedback e¤ect on group A (B). A "social planner" maximizing the sum of the welfare of the two
groups would attain a more e¢ cient outcome by inducing more cooperation. This result holds true
irrespective of group As type.12 Second, war imposes welfare losses on group B (in the form of physical
destruction, human lives, etc.) that are not internalized by the unilateral war decision of group A.13
If we denote such costs by VB, then war is always globally ine¢ cient whenever V < (Sk + SB + VB);
where SB is group B trade surplus. Perhaps more interestingly, the Nash equilibrium may feature too
many wars even from the self-regarding standpoint of group A, due to the ine¢ ciency in the trade
game. Namely, more cooperation could lead group A to retain peace in situations where the Nash
equilibrium does prescribe war. In particular, it is easy to construct examples in which the e¢ cient
level of cooperation in the trade game would induce both the civic and the uncivic type to preserve
peace under BAU, and yet the Nash equilibrium features war when A is uncivic. In other words, the
underprovision of cooperation induces a second layer of ine¢ ciency in the form of too frequent wars.
4 Asymmetric Information
From now on in the paper, we assume that group B can observe neither group As type nor the
realization of V. In this environment, war and peace become public signals of group As type. Beliefs
are common knowledge, and are updated using Bayesrule after the observation of war or peace.
We denote by  1 2 [0; 1] the prior belief held by group B that group As type is civic (or, less
formally, the extent to which group B trusts group A) and by W and P , the posterior beliefs
conditional on war and peace, respectively. It is often convenient to take the likelihood ratios: r 1 
 1= (1   1) and rs  s= (1  s) ; for s 2 fW;Pg. Finally ( ; +) denote the probability that
peace is chosen under BAU by the uncivic and civic type, respectively.
The timing of the game is the following.
12More formally, the e¢ cient solution prescribes that znkB
 
1 + fB
 
LkA

= LkA and znkA
 
1 + fk
 
LkB

= LkB ; where
both nkA and n
k
B are larger than in the decentralized equilibrium. In the case of uniform distributions, this yields
nkA = F
k
 
znkB
 
1 + fB

> F k
 
znkB

and nkB = F
B
 
znkB
 
1 + fk

> FB
 
znkA

; where fk and fB are the constant
density functions. See Appendix C for details.
13We do not allow for cross-group transfers that could reduce the scope of wars. As usual, such transfers entail
commitment problems (cf. Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2006). In the case of ex-ante transfers, group A could cash in, and still
wage war. In the case of ex-post transfers, group B could refuse to pay once the risk of war is gone.
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1. The war stage: agents in group B receive the common prior belief r 1, agents in group A
observe the state V. Conditional on its own type, k 2 f ;+g; group A decides to wage war with
probability 1  k.
2. The trade stage: agents in group B update their beliefs. If there is peace, agents are randomly
matched, gains from trade are realized, and consumption occurs.
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE).
Denition 1 A strategy for an agent in population A species for each possible types, k 2 f+; g
and for each state V 2 fVL; V; VHg; conditional on public beliefs, a war action ("wage war" or "keep
peace"), and, for each possible realization of the idiosyncratic preference shock, P, a trade action
("cooperate" or "defect"). A strategy for an agent in population B species a trade action ("cooperate"
or "defect") for each of the possible realizations of the idiosyncratic preference shock, P; conditional
on public beliefs. A PBE is a strategy prole, a belief system and a triplet
 
n A; n
+
A; nB
 2 [0; 1]3 such
that: (i) in the trade continuation game all agents choose their action so as to maximize the expected
pay-o¤ conditional on the posterior likelihood ratio of beliefs after peace, rP , and the realization of the
preference shock P;  n A; n+A; nB yields the associated measure of agents who optimally cooperate in
group A for each type, k 2 f+; g; and for group B, respectively. (ii) group A chooses the probability
1   k of waging war on group B so as to maximize the total expected utility of its members, given
group As type (k), the shock V 2 fVL; V; VHg and the prior likelihood ratio of beliefs, r 1; (iii) beliefs
are updated using Bayesrule.
4.1 Trade game
We solve the PBE backwards, starting from the Nash equilibrium of the trade game under peace. The
reaction function of group A, which is fully informed, continues to be given by nkA = F
k (znB) ; with
k 2 f+; g. Since nA depends on type k which group B does not observe, group Bs reaction function
becomes FB (zEB(nA j P )) = FB
 
z

Pn
+
A + (1  P )n A

: Rescaling the belief P in term of its
likelihood ratio rP , we obtain that the equilibrium proportions of cooperators in the two groups satisfy
the following xed-point equation:

n A; n
+
A; nB
	
=

F  (znB) ; F+ (znB) ; FB

rP
1 + rP
zF+ (znB) +
1
1 + rP
zF  (znB)

(4)
Proposition 2 characterizes the set of Nash equilibria of the trade game.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1 and given a likelihood ratio of posterior beliefs rP 2 [0;+1) ;
the Nash Equilibrium of the trade game conditional on group As type k 2 f+; g exists and is unique.
The equilibrium proportions of cooperators are given by fn A (rP ) ; n+A (rP ) ; nB (rP )g; implicitly dened
by equation (4). n A (rP ) ; n
+
A (rP ) and nB (rP ) are continuous, weakly increasing and lie strictly within
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the unit interval. Moreover, n A (rP )  n+A (rP ).
The equilibrium trade surplus accruing to group A, Sk (rP ) ; is given by
Sk (rP )  d+ znkA (rP )nB (rP ) 
Z znB(rP )
 1
L dF k = d+
Z znB(rP )
 1
F k (L) dL: (5)
Sk (rP ) is weakly increasing in rP : Moreover, S  (rP )  S+ (rP ) :
Proposition 2 shows that trust has a social value: optimistic prior beliefs about group As type
(large rP ) induce more cooperative behavior from both groups (large nA and nB), and a larger trade
surplus, due to the strategic complementarity: the trust in group A makes group B more cooperative;
this in turn makes group B more trustworthy in group As eyes, further enhancing the cooperation of
group A, and so on. To the opposite, a vicious circle of low trust and trustworthiness makes cooperation
unravel, reducing the trade surplus. Figure 1 plots the equilibrium trade surplus (conditional on group
As actual type) against the posterior belief, P = rP = (1 + rP ) ; in the case of a uniform distribution
of P.14
4.2 War decision and PBE
In this subsection, we analyze the group As war decision, based on the comparison between the trade
surplus, Sk (rP ) ; and the realization of the stochastic benet of war, V. Since the trade surplus
depends on posterior beliefs, we must characterize the mapping from prior to posterior. Bayesrule
yields
ln rP (r 1) = ln r 1 + ln
P + (1  W   P )+ (r 1)
P + (1  W   P )  (r 1) ; (6)
ln rW (r 1) = ln r 1   ln 1  P   (1  W   P )
  (r 1)
1  P   (1  W   P )+ (r 1) ; (7)
where the optimal choice of maintaining peace is given by
k (r 1) =
8<:
0 if Sk (rP (r 1)) < V
2 [0; 1] if Sk (rP (r 1)) = V
1 if Sk (rP (r 1)) > V
: (8)
Note that, since Sk depends on rP , which is endogenous to the war/peace decision, the characterization
of the optimal choice of k involves a xed-point problem that can yield multiple solutions.
Proposition 3 establishes the existence of the PBE. The proof follows immediately from Proposition
2 and is omitted.
Proposition 3 A PBE exists and is fully characterized by the set of equations (4), (5), (6), (7), (8),
given a likelihood ratio of prior beliefs r 1 2 [0;+1) .
14We set z = 0:9, d = 0, and assume FB  [0; 1], F+  [ 0:25; 1], F   [0; 1:25]. The geometric representation entails
some slight abuse of notation, as Sk was dened to be a function of the likelihood ratio rP rather than of P : We prefer
this representation since P 2 [0; 1]; and we can display the range of variation of the surplus for any belief.
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Figure 1: Surplus from trade as function of the posterior belief, and war benet under BAU.
The posterior belief is independent of the observation of war or peace whenever + =  : This
may happen when priors are either very optimistic or, to the opposite, very pessimistic. In particular,
if V < S  (rP ) ; then both types retain peace under BAU (+ (r 1) =   (r 1) = 1), whereas if
V > S+ (rP ) ; then both types wage war under BAU (+ (r 1) =   (r 1) = 0). On the contrary, the
observation of war or peace is informative whenever S  (rP )  V  S+ (rP ) with one inequality
being strict. In this case, the uncivic type would wage war whereas the civic type would preserve
peace (+ (r 1) = 1 and   (r 1) = 0). Thus, peace strengthens the trust of group B towards group
A, while war undermines it. More formally, S  (rP )  V  S+ (rP ) , rP > r 1 > rW : We refer to
this situation as an informative PBE.
Denition 2 Given r 1 a PBE is "informative" i¤ + (r 1) >   (r 1), or identically i¤ rP (r 1) >
r 1 > rW (r 1) : A PBE is "uninformative" i¤ + (r 1) =   (r 1) ; or identically i¤ rP (r 1) =
r 1 = rW (r 1) :
Throughout the rest of the paper, we maintain that V > S+ (0) : This restriction sharpens the
focus on the more interesting case, in which pessimistic beliefs can induce even the civic type to wage
war. For expositional purposes, it is convenient to consider two cases separately: high value of war
(S  (1) < V < S+ (1)) and low value of war (V  S  (1) < S+ (1)).15 High value of war will be
our main case, since it delivers the main economic insights in a simpler way. In this case, the uncivic
type always wages war under BAU, irrespective of public beliefs. The case of low value of war, where
the uncivic type may nd it optimal to mimic the civic type by maintaining peace under BAU, is
discussed in Appendix B. Figure 1 represents the case of high value of war: S  < V for all P ; and
there exists  such that S+ > V if P >  and S+ < V if P < .
15 In the case of low value of war, we assume also that S+(0) < S (1). The set of parameters for which this inequality
holds is non-empty.
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We now discuss the equilibrium mapping from prior to posterior.
Lemma 1 Assume V > S+ (0) and S  (1) < V < S+ (1) : Let r be such that V = S+(r); and
let r  P r=(1  W ): For r 1  r the PBE is unique and uninformative. For r 1 2 [r; r] there are
multiple PBE. For r 1 > r the PBE is unique and informative.
r  = (1  ) is the threshold posterior likelihood ratio below which both types wage war
under BAU. Uninformative PBE are associated with pessimistic priors. Intuitively, when trust is low,
trade opportunities are scant and both the civic and the uncivic type wage war under BAU. When
r 1 2 [r; r], the mapping (8) yields multiple PBE: one uninformative and two informative ones (one
of which involves mixed strategies). While none of our results depends on a specic selection criterion,
we make the following convenient assumption.
Assumption 3 In the range of prior beliefs such that multiple PBE exist, the most informative equi-
librium is selected.
Since our analysis emphasizes the possibility that economies fall into uninformative equilibria, this
is the most conservative selection criterion.
In summary, this section has established the existence and characterization of the set of PBE
(Proposition 3). It has, in addition, introduced a formal distinction between informative and uninfor-
mative PBE and established that for a pessimistic prior the PBE is unique and uninformative, while
for an optimistic prior the PBE is unique and informative, and for a range of intermediate beliefs
there are multiple equilibria (Lemma 1). For this latter case, we provide a simple selection criterion
that simplies the analysis of the dynamic model.
5 The dynamic model
In this section, we extend the analysis to a dynamic economy populated by non-altruistic overlapping
generations of two-period lived agents. The purpose here is to characterize the endogenous intertem-
poral link between stochastic wars and beliefs, which is the main contribution of our paper. In the
rst period of their lives agents make no economic choice, and acquire a common prior belief, based
on the public history regarding warfare.16 In the second period agents make all economic decisions.
After group A decides whether or not to wage war, agents in group B update their beliefs. In the case
of peace, agents are randomly matched to trade. We assume that the information set of young agents
comprises only the history of warfare. In particular, we rule out that young agents can observe the
success of inter-ethnic trade during peace.17
16Since young agents are passive and earn no pay-o¤, one could interpret the model alternatively in terms of a sequence
of one-period lived agents.
17 If agents in group B could observe the average success of current inter-ethnic trade, they could attain a perfect
inference of group As type. Information about the success of inter-community trade in reality is sparse, and di¢ cult to
collect or to distinguish from intra-ethnic trade. In the benchmark model discussed in this section, we also rule out that
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The dynamics of beliefs drives the stochastic process of war, peace and trade. We denote by r0
the common prior of the adult generation at time zero.
Denition 3 A Dynamic Stochastic Equilibrium (DSE) is a sequence of PBE with an associated
sequence of beliefs such that, given an initial likelihood ratio r0; the posterior likelihood ratio at t  1
is the prior likelihood ratio at t; for all t  0.
Combining equations (6)-(8), Lemma 1, and Assumption 3, the equilibrium law of motion of the
likelihood ratio of beliefs is given by the following stochastic di¤erence equation:
ln rt =
8><>:
ln rt 1 if rt 1 2 [0; r]
ln rt 1 + (1 Wt) ln

1 W
P

 Wt ln

1 P
W

if rt 1 > r
(9)
where Wt 2 f0; 1g is a random variable taking on the unit (zero) value if there is war (peace) at date
t. Also, recall that 1 > W + P : In the low-trust region, rt 1 2 [0; r]; the probability of peace is
low (P(Wt = 0) = P ) and beliefs are stationary irrespective of group As type. The observation of a
peace event is attributed rationally to a peace shock. In contrast, in the high-trust region, rt 1 > r,
the probability of peace is low (P(Wt = 0) = P ) if A is uncivic, and high (P(Wt = 0) = 1   W ) if
A is civic. In addition, the equilibrium is informative and peace leads through Bayesian updating 
to an increase in the belief that group A is civic. The stochastic process (9) is represented in Figure
2, which is zoomed around the threshold r.
Suppose that group A is civic, implying that peace and high cooperation would prevail under
perfect information (Proposition 1). Under imperfect information, this low-conict outcome is an
equilibrium only if trust is su¢ ciently high, rt > r. Moreover, an unlucky sequence of war shocks
can spoil trust forever. As soon as rt crosses (from above) the threshold r, group A starts waging
war under BAU even though it is civic, and the probability of war jumps from W to 1  P . Group
B rationally stops updating its beliefs, and no peace spell no matter how long can restore trust.
The following Proposition summarizes the formal characterization of the dynamic equilibrium (proof
in the text).
Proposition 4 Assume that V > S+ (0) and S  (1) < V < S+ (1) : Then, the DSE is characterized
by Proposition 3 and by the law of motion (9). If group A is uncivic, the probability of war is P(Wt =
1) = 1   P . If group A is civic, the probability of war is P(Wt = 1) = 1   P if rt 1 < r; and
P(Wt = 1) = W if rt 1  r.
5.1 War traps and long-run distribution
The next step is to characterize the long-run equilibrium outcome. We start by dening a war trap.
young agents can observe private signals (e.g., a nite sample of trade outcomes). Otherwise, agents would enter the
second period of their lives with heterogenous beliefs, and the dynamic model would become intractable. We relax this
assumption in section 6.2, where we assume that cohorts are connected through dynastic links, and allow information
acquired by traders to be transmitted within families.
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Figure 2: Stochastic law of motion of beliefs.
Denition 4 A "war trap" is a set of states, 
TRAP  R+; such that, for all rt 2 
TRAP ; group A
strictly prefers war under BAU irrespective of its type, and beliefs are stationary: 8s  t; rs = rt:
It follows immediately from (9) that 
TRAP = [0; r): Whatever the state of beliefs, rt < 1; the
economy falls into the war trap with a positive probability, since a nite number of war shocks can
plunge trust below the threshold r . Once the economy is in the trap, beliefs are stationary, trade
is scant and war is frequent. Note that both war and peace shocks are essential for a war trap to
exist. If only war shocks existed, peace would become a perfectly revealing signal since, contrary to
the civic type, the uncivic type would never retain peace under BAU. Thus, the civic type could reveal
his type by not waging war under BAU, and the equilibrium would be identical to the case of perfect
information.
Since the dynamics have no rest point in the informative equilibrium region, one might wonder
whether the economy is deemed to fall into the war trap in the long run. The answer to this question
depends on whether group A is civic or uncivic.
Proposition 5 Assume that V > S+ (0) ; S  (1) < V < S+ (1) ; and r0 > r.
(i) If group A is uncivic, then the DSE enters the war trap in nite time with probability one.
(ii) If group A is civic, then the DSE enters the war trap in nite time with probability PTRAP > 0;
and stays out of the war trap forever with probability 1  PTRAP > 0: If the economy stays out of the
trap, the DSE converges to perfect learning, i.e., rt ! 1; and war incidence stays permanently low,
P(Wt = 1)  ! W :
(iii) The probability PTRAP has the following bounds:
0 <
W
1  P
r
r0
< PTRAP  r
r0
< 1: (10)
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If group A is civic, the economy averts the trap in the long run with a positive probability. However,
if group A is uncivic, the war trap is attained almost surely. The proof is based on the Martingale
Convergence Theorem, ensuring that the stochastic belief t converges almost surely to a limit. This
limit as the proof shows cannot lie in the interior of the informative region, thus either t enters
the trap or limt!1 t = 1: In order for limt!1 t = 1, the economy must remain forever in the
informative region. This possibility can be ruled out if group A is uncivic, since the Strong Law
of Large Numbers would then imply that group B could observe an innite sample of realizations
of the war/peace process, and eventually learn the truth, i.e., that group A is uncivic. This would
cause a contradiction. On the contrary, when group A is civic, group B can learn asymptotically the
truth (i.e., limt!1 t = 1) with positive probability. However, this is not the sole possible outcome.
Alternatively, the economy can fall into the war trap with positive probability. So, the long-run fate
of the economy hinges on luck, or the realization of the stochastic process of peace/war (similarly
to Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997).18 Proposition 5 establishes a lower and an upper bound to the
probability that the economy falls into the trap. However, in a particular case, we can obtain an exact
characterization of PTRAP :
Corollary 1 Assume that group A is civic, V > S+ (0) ; S  (1) < V < S+ (1) ; W = P =  and
r0 > r. Then, the probability that the economy falls into the war trap is PTRAP =


1 
(r0)
, where
(r0)  d(ln r0   ln r) = (ln(1  )  ln)e:
Note that (r0) counts the number of war episodes minus that of peace episodes which is necessary
in order for r to cross the threshold r, given the initial belief r0. Intuitively, PTRAP decreases with
r0: Thus, the probability of an economy falling into a war trap increases (falls) after each war (peace)
episode, since this reduces (increases) r. Our theory predicts, then, that war is endogenously persistent:
each conict increases the probability of future conicts.
When group A is civic, war traps are ine¢ cient outcomes, even relative to the second-best imple-
mented under perfect information (where, recall, peace is retained under BAU). There are too many
wars and, in addition, there is less cooperation than under perfect information. When the economy
converges to perfect learning, the equilibrium is asymptotically identical to the perfect information
outcome, although there is ine¢ ciency along transition. Conversely, when A is uncivic, war traps
may yield higher welfare than the perfect information equilibrium. In the trap, group B fails to learn
perfectly about the uncivicness of group A. Consequently, peace spells are characterized by more eco-
nomic cooperation than under perfect information. Since cooperation tends to be suboptimally low
(see section 3.1), imperfect learning in this case can improve the welfare of both groups.
18The war decision entails an intergenerational spillover, as war depletes trust and harms future generations. In
Appendix B, we show that an equilibrium isomorphic to that of Propositions 4-5 can be sustained as the Markov Perfect
Equilibrium of an extended model where the decision to stage war incorporates an altruistic concern towards the next
generation.
18
5.2 War traps and related literature
In our model, the key for the existence of war traps is that, in some range of priors, the equilibrium
has a separating nature (i.e., di¤erent types take di¤erent actions waging war or retaining peace),
whereas for another range of priors the equilibrium has a pooling nature. In a pooling equilibrium
there is no informative public signal. The dynamics can push the equilibrium towards the pooling
low-trust equilibrium, even though group A is civic. The reason is that, although beliefs are updated
rationally, the updating process is subject to disturbances over time. Signal jamming due to war and
peace shocks makes it possible that agents update beliefs "in the wrong direction". While a long
enough further sampling eventually would correct temporary mistakes and lead to correct learning,
sampling de facto ends (in the sense that agents stop receiving informative signals) as soon as the
economy enters the pooling equilibrium region.
While learning traps are not per se a novel nding, their source and mechanism here are di¤erent
from those described in the existing literature, to the best of our knowledge. In models of informational
cascades (see, e.g., Bikhchandani et al. 1992), agents make decisions sequentially, having access to pri-
vate information and a public signal. They may end up in an informational cascade where each agent
rationally ignores her private information and conforms to the behavior of the majority. In contrast,
in our model there is no private information. In Piketty (1995), learning traps are driven by costly
experimentation and imperfect common knowledge. In his paper, people with identical preferences,
but di¤erent sampling histories, may end up having persistently heterogeneous beliefs about the cost
of redistribution. The mechanism is again very di¤erent from ours, where all information is public.
Experimentation is key also in Aghion et al. (2011). Chamley (1999) studies coordination and social
learning in a dynamic setting with uncertainty and strategic complementarities. The environment is
di¤erent from ours insofar as the game features multiple equilibria under perfect information, whereas
in our stag hunt game the equilibrium is always unique. The main di¤erence in the social learning
process is that in his model the dynamics are driven by exogenous changes in unobservable fundamen-
tals, while in our model the dynamics depend on the individual decisions of players that determine
the surplus from trade. While in our setting learning can break down fully, this is never the case in
Chamleys model. In the extension of section 6.1, we move closer to Chamleys setting by studying
the possibility that group As type changes stochastically.
5.3 War persistence
Our analysis is motivated by the evidence that civil wars feature hysteresis, namely, a conict today
increases the probability of future conicts (see Section 1.1). In the model presented above, each war
episode increases smoothly the long-term frequency of conicts.19 Similarly, one can compute the
19 If we dene the long run frequency of conicts (when group A is civic) as F(rt)  lim
T!+1
E
"
1
T
TX
s=t+1
Ws j k = +; rt
#
;
then Proposition 5 (replacing r0 by rt) implies that F(rt) = PTRAP (rt)  (1   P ) + [1  PTRAP (rt)]  W : Clearly,
F(rt) is decreasing in rt; and each war (peace) episode, by decreasing (increasing) rt, increases (reduces) the frequency
of future conict.
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e¤ect of a war at t on the probability of conict at t+T , for 1 > T  1 (as long as group A is civic).
For each lead T; there exists a threshold rT  r 

1 P
W
T
such that, for all rt 2]r; rT [, a war at t
increases the probability of war at t+T . The nature of the persistence becomes somewhat stark if one
looks at the short-run dynamics (T = 1): then, the probability of war at t+1 increases discretely after
a war at t only if rt is in a right-hand neighborhood of r such that the war immediately pushes the
economy into the trap. This is not a robust feature of the theory. Rather, it hinges on the simplifying
assumption that the stochastic process V has a discrete support. If one assumes that V is drawn from
a continuous distribution, the theory predicts a smoother form of short-run persistence.
In this section, we sketch the argument for the case of a particular continuous distribution of V.20
Suppose V is distributed uniformly in the interval [VL; VH ] where VL < S  (0) < S+ (1) < VH : Note
that the range of realizations V > S+ (1) and V < S  (0) can be interpreted as war and peace shocks,
respectively. Bayesrule implies that
rP (rt) =
P [V < S+ (rP (rt))]
P [V < S  (rP (rt))]  rt =
S+ (rP (rt))  VL
S  (rP (rt))  VL  rt > rt, (11)
rW (rt) =
P [V > S+ (rP (rt))]
P [V > S  (rP (rt))]  rt =
VH   S+ (rP (rt))
VH   S  (rP (rt))  rt < rt: (12)
As in the benchmark model, war (peace) causes a fall (increase) in rt: In Rohner et al. (2012b) we
prove that (i) for any rt; there exists a unique PBE; (ii) the gap between S+ and S  increases with rt;
implying that the war/peace signal becomes more informative as rt grows. The result that the speed
of learning increases smoothly with the level of trust is a generalization of the result in the benchmark
model above, that the speed of learning stays constant in the informative region (rt  r) and falls
discretely to zero in the learning trap (rt < r). The endogenous probability of war becomes now a
continuous decreasing function of rt, rather than a decreasing step function. More formally,
P [Wt+1 = 1 j k; rt] = 1  P
h
V < Sk (rP (rt))
i
=
VH   Sk (rP (rt))
VH   VL : (13)
This is a (continuous) generalization of the second part of Proposition 4. A corollary of (13) is that,
for any rt; a civil conict today by reducing rt increases strictly the probability of a conict next
period. In conclusion, war persistence is a hard prediction of our theory. The particular form that the
hysteresis takes in the benchmark model is instead driven by the simplifying assumption that V has
a discrete support.
6 Extensions
In this section, we discuss some important extensions of the benchmark model.
20See Rohner et al. (2012b, available upon request) for a more detailed and formal analysis of the continuous case.
There, we also show that war traps carry over to a version of the model with a generic continuous distribution of V.
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6.1 Stochastic types
So far, group As type was assumed to be a permanent characteristic. In this section, we generalize
the analysis to an environment in which the group type is subject to stochastic shocks, driven, for
instance, by cultural shifts. For instance, ancient Vikings were an aggressive population prone to war
and looting, whereas their current Scandinavian descendants are regarded as peaceful and cooper-
ative people. Cultural shifts in types can be related to low-frequency changes in political regimes,
institutions, social structures or population mixture (see Tabellini 2008).
We assume that group As type follows a two-state rst-order stochastic Markov process with the
transition matrix
t +  
t  1
+ 1    
   1  
: (14)
We make the realistic assumption that   1=2 and   1=2; implying a positive serial autocorrelation.
The ergodic distribution is summarized by the unconditional likelihood ratio that A is civic r^ = = .
Without loss of generality, we assume that the type shock is realized between the end of period
t  1 and the beginning of period t: This implies that the posterior belief at t  1 is no longer identical
to the prior belief at t: In particular, the mapping from posterior at t  1 to prior at t is given by:
~r (rt 1) =
(1   )rt 1 + 
 rt 1 + 1   ; (15)
where ~r0 (rt 1) > 0 and ~r00 (rt 1) < 0: The equilibrium law of motion of beliefs, (9), can be generalized
according to the following stochastic di¤erence equation:
ln rt =
8><>:
ln ~r (rt 1) if ~r (rt 1) 2 [0; r] ODE
ln ~r (rt 1) + (1 Wt) ln

1 W
P

 Wt ln

1 P
W

if ~r (rt 1) > r StoDE
(16)
In the uninformative region, ~r (rt 1) 2 [0; r], group A wages war under BAU irrespective of its type,
and thus the observation of war/peace conveys no information. The dynamics of beliefs is governed by
an ordinary di¤erence equation (ODE) such that r tends to the unconditional log-likelihood ratio, ln r^.
In the informative region, ~r (rt 1) > r, group A wages war when it is uncivic and retains peace when
it is civic, under BAU. Thus, the dynamics is governed by a stochastic di¤erence equation (StoDE)
comprising both stages of the Bayesian updating: the type shock and war/peace.
A qualitative description of the belief dynamics, (16), is provided by Figure 3.21 It is useful to
dene two constants:
r^+ =
1  W
P
 ~r  r^+ and r^  = W
1  P  ~r
 
r^ 

;
21Note that the gure plots likelihood ratios rather than their logarithms, since the graphical representation is more
e¤ective in levels than in logs.
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Panel a: r r> $ . The economy converges in the long run to r r<$ (war trap).
Panel b : ,r r r
-é ùÎ ê úë û
$ $ . The economy cycles in the long run in the region ,Lr r
+é ù
ê úë û
$ , including both informative and uninformative PBE.
Panel c : r r
-
< $ . The economy cycles in the long run in the region ,r r
- +é ù
ê úë û
$ $ , where the equilibrium is informative (no war trap).
Figure 3: Dynamics of beliefs with stochastic types.
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denoting the limits to which the dynamics of beliefs (16) would converge after an innite sequence of
war and peace episodes, respectively, if the realization of war and peace were informative everywhere
(i.e., if the dynamics were governed by the StoDE for all rt 1). Note that 0 < r^  < r^ = = < r^+.
Three cases are possible (see Appendix C for analytical details and proofs):
1. If r > r^ (panel a of Figure 3), beliefs converge with probability one to the war trap. Conditional
on trust being initially high, the dynamics is governed by the StoDE part of (16) with frequent
spells of peace. However, cooperation is deemed to collapse. As soon as r enters the uninfor-
mative region, [0; r], the ODE of (16) drives the belief process to a monotonic convergence to r^:
Since r^ < r; r^ is an absorbing state. Intuitively, the long-run frequency of the civic type is very
low, making peace and cooperation fragile.
2. If r 2 [r^ ; r^] (panel b of Figure 3), the economy cycles between periods of low trust with frequent
wars (uninformative PBE) and periods of peace with thriving trade (informative PBE). Since
the dynamics has no rest point in particular, r^ is not a steady state, as the gure shows the
economy wanders indenitely in the ergodic set, [r^ ; r^+]; which comprises portions of both the
informative and uninformative region. Suppose that r0 < r: Then, the PBE starts uninformative,
and the dynamics is governed initially by the ODE part of (16): rt grows slowly until it crosses
the threshold r.22 Thereafter, the dynamics is governed by the StoDE part of (16); the PBE
remains informative until the stochastic sequence brings r back below the threshold r. Although
the economy does not get stuck into the uninformative equilibrium region, now and then it falls
into times of raging conict.
3. If r < r^  (panel c of Figure 3), the uninformative region is never visited in the long run. The
ergodic set is again the interval [r^ ; r^+]; but this lies entirely within the informative region. As
soon as the informative region is reached, it is never left, nor do beliefs ever settle to a rest point.
In summary, allowing for shifts in group As type yields richer dynamics without altering the main
insights of our analysis. If the unconditional probability that A is civic is low (panel a of Figure 3) the
economy necessarily falls into a war trap. For an intermediate range of parameters (panel b of Figure
3), cycles emerge in which periods of recurrent conicts and periods of peace and trade alternate.
Spells of recurrent wars are preceded by decreases in reciprocal trust. Finally, if the unconditional
probability that group A is civic is su¢ ciently high (panel c of Figure 3), recurrent wars are not
observed in the long run. This case may represent well-functioning developed societies for which
conicts are rare.
Structural factors such as weak institutions, low human capital, or abundance of natural resources
can determine which of the three regimes prevails. However, these factors alone would not fully explain
22When the uninformative equilibrium region is visited, trust may recover only very slowly, especially if types are very
persistent. In particular, as  ! 1 and ! 1, the dynamics of (15) which drive the exit from the trap become arbitarily
slow.
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the dynamics of conict. In particular, in the intermediate regime described by panel b of Figure 3,
societies that are fundamentally identical may behave di¤erently for prolonged periods.
6.2 Learning from trade
So far in our analysis, the information set of group B has been limited to the history of warfare. The
inference about group As type could be improved if agents were able to directly observe part of the
trade history. For instance, if public records of the outcome of inter-ethnic trade existed, group B could
infer group As type perfectly. Clearly, this is not a realistic scenario, since in reality cross-community
trade and business links are decentralized and hardly distinguishable from intra-community trade.
In this section, we extend the model by assuming that agents are born into (non-altruistic) dynastic
families where information can be transmitted from parents to children.
We expand the information set of group B by allowing agents to acquire (stochastically) some
information through their trade experience. In particular we assume that in each peaceful period
where trade is active, each agent can observe, with a positive probability  (i.i.d. across agents), group
As type. Such "hard information" can be transmitted to the agents o¤spring.23 In this environment,
without additional assumptions, all dynasties would learn perfectly group As type asymptotically. To
prevent the informational friction from vanishing in the long run, we make the realistic assumption
that the inter-generational transmission of hard information is subject to frictions: with the exogenous
probability ; an informed parents child fails to receive the information. In this model,  is an inverse
measure of the e¢ ciency of learning from trade history, and 1= is the average number of generations
to which the information is transmitted. Note that the model of this section nests the benchmark
model in the particular case in which  = 1 (or  = 0).
In every period there is both a hard information inow (uninformed traders learning about group
As type) and an exogenous outow (some informed families forget). In wartime, noone trades and
the net inow necessarily is negative. In peacetime, the net inow can be positive. Intuitively,
information depreciates: if trade was intense in the far past, but then waned due to frequent conicts,
the information gathered through the past trade fades away.
We dene by  the share of informed agents in group B. The state space is now (r; ) 2 R+ [0; 1],
specifying the public belief of uninformed agents and the proportion of informed agents. The PBE of
the trade game is characterized formally in Appendix C, Proposition 9. There, we establish that it is
the unique 4-tuple fn A; n+A; n B; n+Bg 2 [0; 1]4 such that, for k 2 f ;+g; nkA (rP ; ) = F k
 
znkB (rP ; )

and
nkB (rP ; ) = F
B
h
zF k

znkB (rP ; )
i
+ (1  )FB

rP
1 + rP
zF+(zn+B) +
1
1 + rP
zF (zn B)

: (17)
Note that uninformed agents know how many players are informed, but ignore the content of that
information. Di¤erent from Proposition 2, nB depends now on the state k; since a proportion  of
23Although we abstract, for simplicity, from horizontal transmission of information within the group, this could be
added in principle , as long as one retains some frictions in the transmission process.
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Figure 4: Trade surplus with di¤erent proportion of informed players, :
group B players can condition its behavior on k. Note that, in order to set the strategy that maximizes
the expected payo¤, uninformed players must infer the behavior of group A conditional on either state
of nature, k 2 f+; g. Since nkA depends on nkB, the characterization of equilibrium involves keeping
track of both n+B and n
 
B; i.e., the proportion of cooperators conditional on the "true" as well as on
the "counterfactual" type.
To progress further, we specialize the analysis to a uniform distribution of psychological payo¤s
P in both populations. Let Sk (rP ; ) denote the trade surplus of group A. This depends now on As
type, public beliefs, and the proportion of informed agents in B. Corollary 2 in Appendix C proves
that @S =@  0, whereas @S+=@  0, implying that @(S+ S )=@  0. Intuitively, as the share of
informed agents increases, the gap in the extent of cooperation across the two states of nature (i.e.,
n+A vs. n
 
A; and n
+
B vs. n
 
B) becomes wider, and is largest as we approach the perfect information
equilibrium,  ! 1. Such a divergence between the two trade surpluses makes the observation of
war/peace more and more informative for any given rP ; destabilizing the war trap. The comparative
statics is shown in Figure 4, drawn for the same parameter values as Figure 1.
When  = 0 the schedules S+ and S  are identical to those in Figure 1, and a war trap exists.
Increasing  to 0.4 reduces the range of posterior beliefs consistent with the existence of the traps.
Eventually, as  is increased further, the war trap vanishes, as shown by the gray lines in Figure 4,
representing the case of  = 0:8. In summary, the larger the share of informed agents, the harder it is
to sustain the war trap.
In the rest of the section, we show that the war trap is robust to this environment, when  evolves
endogenously. Consider the law of motion of : The set of informed agents at date t + 1 comprises
children of either uninformed traders who acquired (and did not lose) information at t, as long as
there was peace, or informed agents at t who did not experience any memory loss. More formally, the
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law of motion is:
t+1 = (1  )[t + (1 Wt)   (1  t)]: (18)
Note that, if  = 0, the share of informed agents would converge to unity since, due to peace
shocks, some trade occurs even in the war trap and there is no memory loss. In terms of Figure 4, the
schedules S+ and S  would shift progressively outwards every time there is peace, and would never
shift inwards. On the contrary, when  > 0 the share of informed agents can either increase or decrease
over time, implying that the schedules S+ and S  can shift either inwards or outwards. Moreover,
the share of informed agents is bounded away from unity. In particular, equation (18) implies that,
as long as 0 < 1 () 

1 + (1 )
 1
; then t < 1 () for any t > 0 and for any realization, Wt; of
the war stochastic process. Note that 1 () corresponds to the limit to which the economy converges
after an innite sequence of peace shocks (Wt = 0, for all t).24
Looking back at Figure 4, a war trap exists if S+ (0; 1 ()) < V: In this case, the S+ schedule
crosses the horizontal V line for all feasible values of : In particular, there exists a low range of
public beliefs (0 < r < r ()) such that both the civic and the uncivic type wage war even though the
share of informed agents is at its upper bound. In Appendix C, we provide a complete closed form
characterization of the war trap. We rst show that there exists a constant W < 1 such that a war
trap exists if and only if   W : Then, given ; we characterize the threshold r () such that, for any
r < r () the economy is in a war trap.
When agents learn through trade, it is also possible to observe war cycles. Suppose that group
A is civic and that the economy initially is in the informative region. Suppose, in addition, that
S+ (0; 1 ()) > V; so that there is no war trap. Yet, a sequence of war shocks can push the economy
into a region where both groups wage war under BAU, and thus the probability of war is high (1 W ).
Moreover, each war spell brings about the collapse of trade, causing a further reduction in the share
of informed agents () who trust group A. Even though, for any state of the economy, there exist
sequences of peace shocks that can bring the economy out of the uninformative region, each war
episode makes the economy sink deeper into the vicious cycle of low trust and low trade. Conversely,
peace episodes become very important. Although peace is per se no informative public signal, during
each peace spell agents trade and informed traders build up and transmit to future generations trust
towards the other group. This result is related to Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2012) where trust cycles
also hinge on a (di¤erent) form of limited memory.
6.3 Other extensions
In order to achieve tractability, we have introduced a number of important simplications. For in-
stance, we have assumed that the net benets from war are exogenous, and orthogonal to observable
and unobservable characteristics of the aggressor, including its propensity to cooperate while trading.
24The region  > 1 () corresponds to a set of non-recurrent states. If the economy starts in such a set, it abandons
it in nite time with probability one.
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Another caveat is that so far the analysis has been restricted to two groups. While a thorough gen-
eralization along these and other dimensions is left to future research, in this section we sketch two
rst-step extensions.
In the rst extension, we introduce correlation between group As propensity to cooperate and the
stochastic process V. In particular, we assume that the uncivic type has weaker psychological barriers
against attacking the other group. We consider two cases. First, we assume that the benets of war
under BAU are type-dependent: Vk 2 fVL; V k; VHg; where k 2 f+; g and V   > V + (the uncivic
enjoys war more than does the civic under BAU). In this case, the qualitative results of the benchmark
model remain unchanged. A war trap continues to exist, as long as V + > S+(0). Second, we assume
that V   = V + = V; but the probability of war (peace) shocks is higher when group A is uncivic
(civic):  W > 
+
W and 
 
P < 
+
P . The probabilities of BAU stay unchanged (
 
W +
 
P = 
+
W +
+
P ), for
simplicity. The main new result is that the observation of war and peace is now always informative,
irrespective of beliefs. Even in the region where both types wage war under BAU, the probability of
a peace (war) shock is now higher when A is civic (uncivic), and thus rP (r 1) > r 1 > rW (r 1).25
Strictly speaking, this extension features no war trap. However, wars become highly frequent and
persistent whenever r < r; since both types wage war under BAU. In that region, every war spell sinks
the economy deeper and deeper into the vicious cycle of distrust and low cooperation.
In the second extension (analyzed more formally in Appendix C), we assume that the economy is
inhabited also by a third group, C, which can trade with A. Group A can only wage war against B.
During wartime, there is no trade between A and B, but A can trade with C. Trade between A and C
is subject to no informational friction (for simplicity), but is less productive than trade between A and
B, reecting the lower skill of group C. The intensity of the link between A and C is parameterized
by the payo¤ of their bilateral trade.
This analysis highlights a new interesting implication. If from group As standpoint trade with C
is a substitute of trade with B, then opening a trade link with a third group increases the range of
beliefs such that A wages war on B. Intuitively, the opportunity cost of war is lower if during wartime
A can replace the destroyed trade with B with newly created trade with C (even though this trade is
less productive).26 On the contrary, if trade with C is a complement of trade with B, a stronger trade
link between A and C reduces the probability of an aggression against B.
For example, if entrepreneurs in group A can hire workers in either group B or C, and these workers
25More formally, the log-likelihood ratios evolve now as follows:
ln rP (r 1) = ln r 1 + ln
+P +
 
1  +W   +P

+ (r 1)
 P +
 
1   W    P

  (r 1)
;
ln rW (r 1) = ln r 1   ln 1  
 
P  
 
1   W    P

  (r 1)
1  +P  
 
1  +W   +P

+ (r 1)
:
26Similar implications obtain in a model where, in peacetime, C trades with B, regarded to be a better partner than
A. A successful attack of A on B destroys any trade involving B, eventually forcing C to trade with A. In this case, the
competition motive strengthens the drive to attack B.
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have substitutable skills, the availability of workers from C reduces the economic losses su¤ered by A
during an inter-ethnic war with B. However, if members of group B alongside trading directly with A
act as middlemen between A and C, then the trade link between A and C turns into a war deterrent.
Intuitively, not only does war disrupt the trade between A and B, but it also causes collateral damage
to the trade between A and C. In the next section, we show that these predictions are consistent with
the empirical evidence that the probability of inter-ethnic conict is indeed higher when groups hold
substitutable skills rather than complementary skills.
7 Trade and civil conict: evidence from case studies
In this section, we document case-study evidence of the link connecting trust, inter-ethnic trade (or,
more generally, social interaction), and war.
The surplus of inter-ethnic trade clearly depends on how much di¤erent communities are specialized
in complementary activities, as we discuss in section 6.3. In line with this prediction, Horowitz
(2000) shows that strong economic inter-group complementarities contribute to inter-ethnic peace.
Examples include Indonesia, Myanmar, Malaysia and India where middleman minorities often have
been shielded from political violence, as they provide valuable services to the local ethnic majority.
A similar conclusion is reached by Jha (2008) who studies Hindu-Muslim interactions using town-
level data for India. He nds that during medieval times in Indias trade ports, Hindus and Muslims
provided complementary services to each other, and argues that this business interaction led to religious
tolerance and a lower level of political violence in these trade ports than in other Indian towns.
Interestingly, this kind of situation persists today. In a similar vein, Varshney (2001, 2002) argues
that the existence of inter-ethnic business and civic associations can stunt the potential for riots
in India. According to Varshney, for the prevention of ethnic conict "trust based on interethnic,
not intraethnic, networks is critical" (2001: 392). Bardhan (1997) discusses how waning inter-ethnic
business links, due to exogenous factors lowering the opportunity costs of conict, resulted in the
outbreak of riots.27 Moving to Africa, Olsson (2010) shows that an exogenous change in climatic
conditions (i.e. a severe drought) has brought to a collapse of the inter-ethnic trade between farmers
and herders in Sudans Darfur region, and that this breakdown has been followed by the outbreak of
conict.28 Similarly, Porter et al. (2010) carry out in-depth interviews with market traders in areas of
Nigeria characterized by inter-ethnic tensions, and nd that the existence of inter-ethnic trade links
27"On the Moradabad riots of 1980: The higher wages in the brass industry and entrepreneurship brought about not
only greater prosperity among the Muslims, it also began to lessen the importance of the middlemen, often Hindu, in
business transactions. Some of the Muslim entrepreneurs even managed to get direct orders from West Asian countries.
The Hindu middlemen thus edged out began to rally round the Jan Sangh (now BJP) which has its base among petty
businessmen" (Bardhan, 1997: 1397).
28Also UNICEF (2003) nds that exogenous collapses in inter-ethnic markets have resulted in conicts in Darfur: "The
groups confronting each other in the current conicts have a long history of guarded cooperation and relative peaceful
coexistence. In the past, they exchanged goods and services; indeed some of the herds that the Arab nomads reared
belonged to wealthy Fur who did not opt to become nomads themselves. The Fur sold most of their herds on the onset
of the drought in 1982/83. This was considered a severance of economic relations, which strained the relations between
the Fur and the Arabs" (UNICEF, 2003: 53).
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prevents the outbreak of full-blown riots.
Another prediction of our theory is that, whenever war depletes trust, inter-group trade tends to
collapse. In line with this prediction, Guiso et al. (2009) provide evidence of a causal negative e¤ect of
the long-run intensity of bilateral warfare (over the 1000-1970 period) on the current level of bilateral
trust and trade in a sample of European countries (see also Glick and Taylor, 2010). Looking at a more
recent episode, in Rohner et al. (2012a) we nd that post-conict economic recovery in Uganda was
especially slow in counties that both had been subject to intensive ghting and were more ethnically
fractionalized (an interaction e¤ect), likely because of the collapse of inter-ethnic business cooperation.
Similarly, Cassar et al. (2011) nd that exposure to ethnic conict in Tajikistan undermined the former
victimswillingness to participate in market activity involving trade with people with whom they do
not have a personal connection.
Trust, trade and conict appear to have been intertwined in Rwanda. Case studies from Ingelaere
(2007) and Pinchotti and Verwimp (2007) document that throughout the 1980s inter-ethnic trust was
relatively high and sustained symbiotic business relationships, cooperation in agricultural production
associations and mixed rotating savings groups involving both Hutus and Tutsis. Survey data indicate
that trust plummeted as of 1990, after localized ethnic ghting erupted in northern Rwanda (Ingelaere,
2007). The collapse of trust was followed by fading trade and business links between the communities,
until inter-ethnic cooperation ceased altogether at the onset of the 1994 genocide.29 Even several
years after the conict, the average inter-ethnic trust levels are signicantly lower than in the 1980s
(Ingelaere, 2007), and also inter-ethnic trade is persistently low (Colletta and Cullen, 2000).
Similarly, UNICEF (2003) documents that in several of Darfurs conicts inter-group trust and
trade broke down in the aftermath of ghting. For example, the civil war has resulted in the disin-
tegration of the traditional economic arrangements between nomads and farmers regulating the use
of pastureland and access to water in the Upper Nile region. This collapse of economic coopera-
tion spurred kidnapping and other forms of inter-ethnic violence, triggering more local conicts. The
same pattern is also found elsewhere in Africa. Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero (2012) study the 2007
Kenyan electoral violence. Their survey data indicate that violence decreased trust between ethnic
groups (while increasing trust within ethnic groups). Furthermore, after episodes of violence, people
indicated that they tend to do less business with people from other ethnic groups and that they nd
violence more justiable.
There are also case studies documenting the detrimental e¤ect of war on trust and trade in Eu-
rope. Blagojevic (2009) nds that after the Bosnian war inter-ethnic trust collapsed and that the
economic cooperation between the Serbian population on the one hand, and the Bosnian and Croat-
ian population on the other declined sharply, being often replaced by intense inter-ethnic competition.
Similarly, according to Kaufman (1996) the war in Moldova ushered in a climate of distrust between
29Colletta and Cullen, (2000:45) nd that while vertical (within-group) social capital remained intact, "conict deeply
penetrated such forms of horizontal social capital as exchange, mutual assistance, collective action, trust and the pro-
tection of the vulnerable. [...] The use of credit in exchanges was common in preconict Rwanda. This practice has
diminished over time, in part due to decreased levels of trust as a consequence of warfare".
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the Moldavans and the Russian-speaking minority, and ultimately a substantial decline in inter-ethnic
business cooperation.
8 Policy implications
Our model implies that policies intended to increase the return from inter-ethnic trade  e.g., by
reducing cross-community trade frictions, or facilitating the economic integration of minorities in-
crease the opportunity cost of war, narrowing the range of beliefs that sustain war traps.30 Formally,
scaling up the economic pay-o¤ of the stag hunt game causes an upward shift of both S+ and S  in
Figure 1, shifting  to the left, and possibly even ruling out the trap altogether. This prediction lines
up with the empirical results of Horowitz (2000) on a¢ rmative action and ethnic conict. He nds
that preferential programs aiming to improve the integration of less advanced ethnic groups in the
national economy have reduced the potential for conict in various countries such as India, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Nigeria.31 Since trade typically thrives in fast-growing economies, our theory is also
broadly consistent with the evidence that high economic growth reduces the risk of war recurrence
(Sambanis, 2008; Walter, 2004). The theory also suggests a role for policy incentivizing inter-ethnic
cooperation (in our model, increasing z). For instance, improving contract enforcement and punishing
fraudulent behavior in business relationships would reduce the payo¤ of cheating and opportunistic
behavior, thereby increasing the trade surplus. In the alternative interpretation of the trade game
provided in section 2.1, z could be increased by policies supporting human capital formation, such
as promoting the knowledge of multiple national languages or of other cultural aspects that a¤ect
inter-ethnic barriers. This nding is in line with the evidence that higher education expenditures and
enrollment rates decrease the risk of civil wars (Thyne, 2006).
To the opposite, larger windfall gains from war ( i.e., larger V ) expand the potential for war traps.
For instance, the discovery of oilelds or diamond mines can drive an economy in which trust was
initially low into a war trap, while the same discovers would have no detrimental e¤ects in economies
where trust and cooperation were high in the rst place. Here the predictions of our theory conform
well with the evidence that more abundant natural resources fuel war recurrence and hinder post-war
recovery in fragile states dominated by low trust (see, e.g., Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2004;
Sambanis, 2008), while typically they have no harmful consequences in high-trust strong states like
Norway. International sanctions, such as embargoes on arms or on natural resource imports from
regimes that have seized power through ethnic wars could reduce V .
30While we have assumed, for simplicity, that the matching process is frictionless, one can easily extend the model
to incorporate search frictions. In this environment, only a fraction of the agents seeking partnerships would be able to
trade. The stronger the frictions, the lower the trade surplus. Active integration policies reducing such frictions would
ultimately shrink the range of war traps.
31Horowitz (2000) and Whah (2010) show that the programs of state-induced inter-ethnic joint venture companies in
Malaysia dating from the 1970s have in many instances enhanced trust between the Malay and the Chinese population
reducing social tensions. Similarly, Augenbraun et al. (1999) nd that microenterprise lending by donors in Bosnia
for inter-ethnic joint ventures has worked well, not only in a purely economic sense, but also calming tensions between
groups.
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Our theory has ambiguous implications about the e¤ectiveness of international peacekeeping. The
benchmark model predicts that international peacekeeping interventions limited to "stopping the
shooting" will have only short-lasting e¤ects on political stability. External military-backed peace-
keeping may even be detrimental, if local groups attribute any peace episode to the mere presence of
foreign troops, and then stop updating beliefs. However, according to the extension of section 6.2,
even an externally imposed truce can be useful if it restores some inter-ethnic trade that induces some
learning and trust rebuilding. The nature of the peace-keeping intervention becomes therefore crucial:
If the intervention simply keeps the ghting groups apart, it will not achieve permanent e¤ects. Yet, if
peacekeeping is rst complemented and then replaced by trade- and trust-enhancing measures, it can
be e¤ective. These ambiguous predictions are in line with the gloomy appraisal of a variety of studies
on the survival of peace. According to Sambanis (2008: 30): "UN missions have a robust positive
e¤ect on peacebuilding outcomes, particularly participatory peace, but the e¤ects occur mainly in the
short run and are stronger when peacekeepers remain." Luttwak (1999: 37) goes further, and argues
that mere peacekeeping unless accompanied by trade-promoting or trust-restoring measures does
not lead to lasting peace; it simply interrupts hostilities that will recur once the UN troops leave:
"(Peacekeeping), perversely, can systematically prevent the transformation of war into peace. The
Dayton accords are typical of the genre: they have condemned Bosnia to remain divided into three ri-
val armed camps, with combat suspended momentarily but a state of hostility prolonged indenitely...
Because no path to peace is even visible, the dominant priority is to prepare for future war rather
than to reconstruct devastated economies and ravaged societies."
Our theory also suggests that policies directly targeting beliefs may be important when distrust
hinges on no fundamental reasons (in the model, k = +), yet cooperation is hindered by bad beliefs.
In such cases, creating pro-trade public information, for instance by documenting and publicizing
successful episodes of inter-ethnic business cooperation, can help end the vicious cycle. There is
indeed empirical evidence that inter-group prejudices can be weakened by targeted media exposure
(Paluck, 2009; Paluck and Green, 2009). According to Palucks (2009) ndings the listeners exposed
to the "social reconciliation" radio soap opera in Rwanda were signicantly more likely to nd it
"not naive to trust" and to feel empathy for other Rwandans than the control group exposed to a
"health" radio soap opera. Similarly, Bardhan (1997) shows that in India direct targeting of Muslims
and Hindusbeliefs by spreading success stories of cooperation has reduced distrust and the potential
for conicts: "Public information on what actually happened, on how a disturbance started, on who
tried to take advantage of it, on instances of intercommunity cooperation in the face of tremendous
odds, etc., if e¤ectively transmitted in the early stages, can stop some of the vicious rumors that fuel
communal riots and calm group anxieties" (Bardhan, 1997: 1395).
Finally, when the fundamentals are bad (in the model, k =  ), public campaigns aimed to shift
collective preferences may be e¤ective. Such campaigns may aim either to foster pro-cooperative
norms, or to eradicate prejudice and dislike towards specic communities (both cases can be modeled
as shifts in the distribution of P) . For instance, Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002) document that a strong
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press and education campaign was key to slashing corruption and opportunistic practices in Hong
Kong during the 1970s. Denazication after World War II is an example in which the campaign
targeted peoples preferences pointedly, aiming to eradicate racial hatred against minorities. In terms
of our model, these campaigns may be viewed as measures to promote cultural shifts, such as those
happening exogenously in section 6.1. While the statement that campaigns against racial hatred can
reduce conict may sound obvious, our theory warns that such campaigns may be of limited help
if they do not target, simultaneously, the beliefs (trust) of the victims. For instance, our model of
section 6.1 shows that if group B perceives a change of group As type to be very unlikely (case 1),
even a campaign that successfully turns group A from uncivic to civic may prove ine¤ective. This
issue is salient in countries prone to civil conicts where the ethnic group in majority replaces a radical
sectarian government with a more inclusive one, but fails to restore the condence of minorities.
While the theory suggests a number of useful policy implications, a caveat is that these are valid
under a set of specic assumptions that may not capture salient aspects of particular conicts. We
focus on a broad category of inter-group social interactions taking the form of a stag hunt game.
However, there may be other forms of inter-group interactions with di¤erent payo¤ structures and
incentives. For instance, recent empirical literature shows that ethnic diversity may have di¤erent
e¤ects depending on whether cross-group interactions are about rival (private) or non-rival (public)
goods (Esteban et al., 2012; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2012).
9 Conclusion
This paper provides a theory in which asymmetric information and cultural transmission of beliefs
can explain why societies enter into recurrent civil conicts even when there is no fundamental reason
for conicts to occur. We emphasize the link between trade and war, which has been highlighted
in the recent literature on international conicts. We believe that this connection can be even more
salient in inter-group conicts within countries where business relationships are decentralized and do
not need the mediation of institutions that can aggregate and di¤use information. Our discussion has
emphasized the role of inter-ethnic trade, which we hold to be especially important. However, our
theory can be extended to a broader set of social interactions within countries, including inter-ethnic
marriages, public good provision in villages and communities, and more general situations involving
bilateral cooperation across ethnic cleavages.
While our current study presents a rational-agent theory, integrating psychological aspects may
reveal more about these issues. For instance, exposure to war during childhood may be especially
important, since many beliefs and values are formed at tender ages. In our model, heterogeneous
preferences are exogenous, while in reality these may be shaped by parental transmission, as in Hauk
and Saez-Marti (2002). Our analysis also abstracts from general equilibrium e¤ects that may a¤ect
the opportunity costs of wars and the returns to violent resource appropriation (as emphasized by Dal
Bo and Dal Bo, 2011). Finally, we have abstracted from institutions and state capacity (Besley and
Persson, 2010). As emphasized by Aghion et al. (2011), institutions and beliefs are not independent
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factors: on the one hand, institutions can a¤ect the trust-building process, while on the other trust
can inuence institutional developments that can deter conict. Reforming institutions in a more
inclusive direction (in the sense of Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012) can help build inter-ethnic trust
and trade. Studying these interconnections is left to future research.
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Appendix I
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2. The proof of Proposition 2 encompasses the proof of Proposition
1, since perfect information is a particular case of imperfect information, where either P = 0 (if k =  ) or
P = 1 (if k = +).
We start by proving that a PBE exists. Given the denition P  rP1+rP , we can write the third element of
equation (4) as
nB = ~F
B (nB; P )  FB
 
P zF
+ (znB) + (1  P ) zF  (znB)

: (19)
We claim three properties of ~FB : (i) ~FB : [0; 1]2 ! [0; 1] is a continuous function, with 0 < ~FB (nB; P ) < 1;
(ii) ~FB (nB; P ) is increasing in P ; for any nB; (iii) ~FB (nB; P ) is non-decreasing and convex in nB; for
any B:
Note, rst, that Assumption 1 implies that FB; F+ and F  are continuous non-decreasing convex functions.
Then, (i) follows from the fact that ~FB is a convex combination of two c.d.f.s, F+ and F ; which are continuous
functions. Assumption 1 guarantees that 0 < ~FB (nB; P ) < 1; (ii) follows from the fact that ~FB is a convex
combination of two c.d.f.s F+ and F ; with weights P and 1 P ; respectively, where F  (znB) < F+ (znB)
which in turn follows from the assumption that H+ rst-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) H ; (iii)
follows from the fact that ~FB is a non-decreasing convex transformation of the convex combination of two
non-decreasing convex functions of nB .
Given (i), the existence, for any given P 2 [0; 1]; of nB = nB (P ) satisfying (19) follows from the
Brouwer xed-point theorem. Since 0 < ~FB (nB;P ) < 1; then the xed-point of (19) must be strictly
within the unit interval. (ii)-(iii) guarantee that the mapping nB (P ) is unique and is monotonically weakly
increasing. We prove uniqueness by contradiction. Assume that, for some P ; there exists a second xed point
n^B = ~F
B (n^B;P ) :Without loss of generality, let nB (P ) < n^B: The second xed point, n^B 2 [nB; 1] ; can
be expressed as the convex combination n^B =
1 n^B
1 nB(P )  n

B (P ) +
n^B nB(P )
1 nB(P )  1: Then, applying to n^B
the convexity criterion of ~FB yields
~FB (n^B;P )  1  n^B
1  nB (P )
~FB (nB (P ) ;P ) +
n^B   nB (P )
1  nB (P )
~FB (1;P )
and this leads to
n^B  1  n^B
1  nB (P )
nB (P ) +
n^B   nB (P )
1  nB (P )
~FB (1;P )
which in turn implies (since nB (P ) < n^B) that ~F
B (1;P ) > 1, contradicting property (i). This establishes
the uniqueness of the equilibrium mapping nB (P ) : That n

B (P ) is monotonically weakly increasing follows
immediately from claim (ii).
Next, dene nB (P ) = n

B

rP
1+rP

 nB (rP ). The analysis above establishes that the function nB (rP )
exists, is unique, is weakly increasing and lies strictly within the unit interval. That the same properties carry
over to n A (rP ) = F
  (znB (rP )) and n+A (rP ) = F
+ (znB (rP )) is immediate. Thus, equation (4) has a
unique xed point. Since F  FOSD F+; then n A (rP )  n+A (rP ) : This proves the rst part of the proposition.
The formula of the trade surplus is derived from integrating by parts
R znB(rP )
 1 L dF k =  
L F kznB(rP ) 1 +R znB(rP )
 1 F
k (L) dL; where L F kznB(rP ) 1 = znkA (rP )nB (rP ) ; and simplifying terms. Since F k is non
negative and nB (rP ) is non-decreasing, then Sk (rP ) must be non-decreasing. That S  (P )  S+ (P ) ;
nally, follows again from the fact that F  FOSD F+: QED
Proof of Lemma 1.We proceed in two steps: (i) we prove that an uninformative PBE exists if and only
if r 1  r; (ii) we prove that informative PBE exist if and only if r 1  r: (i) and (ii) together prove the
Lemma.
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(i) First, we prove (by guess-and-verify) that an uninformative PBE exists if r 1  r: Guess that an
uninformative PBE exists. Then, r 1  r ) rP (r 1) = r 1  r, which in turn implies that V 
S+ (rP (r 1)) > S  (rP (r 1)) : Thus, + (r 1) =   (r 1) = 0, verifying the guess. Second, we prove (by
contradiction) that an uninformative PBE exists only if r 1  r: Suppose that an uninformative PBE exists
in the range r 1 > r: Then, by the denition of uninformative equilibrium, rP (r 1) = r 1 > r, which
in turn implies that S+ (rP (r 1)) > V and S  (rP (r 1)) < V: Thus, + (r 1) = 1 and   (r 1) = 0;
contradicting that the PBE is uninformative.
(ii) First, we prove (by guess-and-verify) that informative PBE exist if r 1  r: Guess that an informative
PBE exists such that + (r 1) = 1 and   (r 1) = 0 (note: it can be established that a mixed strategy
equilibrium such that 0 < + (r 1) < 1 and   (r 1) = 0 also exists in this range, but this is not essential
to prove the Lemma, so the proof is omitted). Then, r 1  r ) 1 > rP (r 1)  r, which in turn
implies that S  (rP (r 1)) < V  S+ (rP (r 1)) : Thus, + (r 1) = 1 and   (r 1) = 0, verifying the
guess. Second, we prove (by contradiction) that an informative PBE exists only if r 1  r: Suppose that an
informative PBE exists in the range r 1 < r: Then, r 1 < r ) rP (r 1) < r, which in turn implies that
V > S+ (rP (r 1)) > S  (rP (r 1)) : Thus, + (r 1) =   (r 1) = 0; contradicting that the equilibrium is
informative. QED
Proof of Proposition 5. The process t is a bounded non-negative martingale. Hence, the Martingale
Convergence Theorem implies that, almost surely, the limit 1 = limt!1 t exists and is unique. Let  k1
denote the support of 1 when group As type is k 2 f ;+g: Let ~
TRAP =
i
r=(1 PW + r); r=(1 + r)
i
denote the war trap (in term of the state space of beliefs, t) without the range of non-recurrent states,h
0; r=(1 PW + r)
i
. Also, let the open set  I =]
r
1+r ; 1[ denote the interior of the informative region.
We start by proving two key results: (1) for any k 2 f ;+g;  I \ k1 = ?; (2) 1 =2   1 (i.e., when k =  ;
t cannot converge to the "wrong" perfect learning). Both claims are proven by contradiction.
1. Suppose that 1 2  I : Then, there exists T < 1 such that, for all t  T; t 2  I : Next, recall that
within the informative region the dynamics of (the likelihood ratio of) beliefs is governed by (9). Taking
limits as t ! +1 and replacing r by its denition yields: lim t!1 (ln rt   ln rt 1) = ln 11+1  
ln 11+1 = 0 = lim t!1

(1 Wt) ln

1 W
P

 Wt ln

1 P
W

: This is a contradiction, since the
last term does not converge.
2. Suppose that k =   and 1 = 1: Then, there exists T < 1 such that, for all t  T; t must remain
forever in the informative region ( > r1+r ). But then, the Strong Law of Large Numbers implies that,
as t ! 1; the empirical frequencies of war/peace converge to the true underlying probabilities. Then,
we should have that 1 = 0, leading to a contradiction.
(1) and (2) jointly establish that, (i) if k =  , then   1  ~
TRAP (the DSE enters the war trap almost
surely); (ii) if k = +, then  +1  ~
TRAP [ f1g (the DSE either enters the war trap or converges to truthful
learning).
Let PTRAP  P[1 2 ~
TRAP j k = +]. Since t is a martingale, then, 0 = E [t] ;8t: Moreover,
0 = lim
t!1E0 [t] (20)
= 0  E [1 j k = +] + (1  0) E [1 j k =  ] ;
where
E [1 j k = +] = PTRAP  E
h
1 j k = +; 1 2 ~
TRAP
i
+ (1  PTRAP ) 1: (21)
Combining (20) and (21) we obtain, after standard algebra,
PTRAP =
1  0
0
E [1 j k =  ]
1  E
h
1 j k = +; 1 2 ~
TRAP
i : (22)
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From the denition of ~
TRAP we immediately obtain
r
1 P
W
+r
< E
h
1 j k = +; 1 2 ~
TRAP
i
 r1+r :
Similarly, since   1  ~
TRAP , then r1 P
W
+r
< E [1 j k =  ]  r1+r : Combining these two inequalities
with (22), and using the denition r0  01 0 yields, after standard algebra, (10). This completes the proof of
Proposition 5. QED
Proof of Corollary 1. Consider now the case of Corollary 1, W = P = . In this case, the
state space of the stochastic process (9) is isomorphic to Z : at any time horizon, the termination value of
the process is fully characterized by the initial condition and by the total number of wars minus the total
number of peace episodes (e.g., the termination value is the same after the sequence war-war-peace as after
the sequence peace-war-war). This implies that, given 0; the set of possible realizations belonging to the
war trap, 1 2 ~
TRAP ; is reduced to a singleton  (0) characterized by (0)1+(0) 
0
1+0


1 
(r0)
and (r0)  d(ln r0   ln r) = (ln(1  )  ln)e: Hence,  +1 = f (0)g [ f1g and   1 = f (0)g: Con-
sequently, E [1 j k =  ] = E
h
1 j k = +; 1 2 ~
TRAP
i
=  (0) : Thus, equation (22) simplies to
PTRAP = 1 00
(0)
1 (0) =


1 
(r0)
: This concludes the proof of Corollary 1. QED
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APPENDIXES A, B and C (webpage)
This document comprises three appendixes. Appendix A provides details about the data and
empirical analysis of section 1.1. Appendix B presents two extensions not discussed in the text.
Finally, Appendix C provides technical details of the analysis in sections 3 and 6 in the text.
A Empirical analysis
In this appendix we will describe in more detail the data and specication used for the empirical
analysis of Table 1. In Table 2 we provide a more detailed and complete version on the columns
1-8 of Table 1 (where the unit of observation is a country in a given ve-year-period). Similarly,
Table 3 contains a more detailed and complete version of columns 9-10 of Table 1 (where the unit of
observation is a country in a given year).
Data and specication
Our dependent variable is civil war incidence, taken from the "UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict Dataset"
(UCDP, 2012), which is the most commonly used standard data source for civil wars at the country
level.32 While this data does not contain information about the number of fatalities in a given conict
and year, it codes two di¤erent intensity levels, "minor armed conicts" (between 25 and 999 battle-
related deaths in a given year) and "wars" (at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a given year). Our
dependent variable in Table 2 (resp., in Table 3) is a dummy taking a value of 1 if in a given country
and at any point in a given ve-year period (resp., in a given year) a civil conict took place, and
0 otherwise. While in all "odd" columns of the regression analysis we code as 1 all civil conict
observations, i.e. minor armed conicts as well as wars, in all "even" columns we only code the
dependent variable as 1 when a major war with at least 1000 battle-related deaths took place.
The rst main explanatory variable is in both tables a dummy taking a value of 1 when there
has been a war at any point during the last ve years, where the war denition used is obviously
the same as for the dependent variable (i.e. all conicts for all odd columns, and only big wars for
all even columns). The second main explanatory variable in both Tables, lagged average trust in a
given country and year, is taken from the World Values Survey (2011). The World Values Survey
trust surveys are only conducted every few years since 1981, and the newest available data  which
is the one we are using covers maximum ve waves of surveys per country. The trust measure we
use for a given country and ve-year-period is the average proportion of respondents in the survey
wave(s) taking place during this period and location who answer "Most people can be trusted" to the
question "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be
very careful in dealing with people?" (A165).
We use a standard battery of control variables, which results in a specication that is extremely
close to the core specications run by Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoe­ er (2004), Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol (2005), Cederman and Girardin (2007), Collier and Rohner (2008), and Esteban
et al. (2012). Like these papers, we control for democracy, GDP per capita, natural resources (oil
exporter), population size, ethnic fractionalization, and geography (mountainous terrain and noncon-
tiguous states). These variables are described in more detail at the end of this appendix.
Results
Table 2 displays exactly the same regression results in the rst eight columns as in columns 1-8 of Table
1 in the main text. The only di¤erence is that we display to avoid duplicationthe point estimates,
32Recent papers that also focus on civil war incidents using the same war data like us include for example Besley and
Persson (2011) and Esteban et al. (2012).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
War (t-1) 3.13*** 3.67*** 2.65*** 2.92*** 3.12*** 2.69*** 3.28** 2.08 3.44*** 2.30 0.96*** 0.84**
(0.21) (0.26) (0.24) (0.28) (0.46) (0.47) (1.29) (1.50) (1.19) (1.64) (0.23) (0.34)
Trust (t-1) -5.13** -11.11***
(2.33) (3.37)
Democracy (t-1) -0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.29* -0.01 -0.18 0.01 -0.08*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.13) (0.18) (0.11) (0.17) (0.03) (0.05)
ln GDP p.c.(t-1) -0.22 -0.34** -0.10 -0.43* 0.63 0.02 0.32 -0.94 0.20 0.36
(0.15) (0.15) (0.19) (0.23) (0.62) (1.30) (0.58) (1.16) (0.45) (0.64)
Oil exporter (t-1) 0.30 0.40 0.63 0.62 1.15 -2.38 1.16 -1.68 0.18 0.85
(0.31) (0.43) (0.41) (0.75) (0.79) (2.29) (0.81) (2.51) (0.89) (1.42)
ln Popul.(t-1) 0.24*** 0.34*** -0.13 0.09 0.72 2.38*** 0.57 1.58*** 0.57 -2.02
(0.08) (0.10) (0.16) (0.25) (0.50) (0.44) (0.48) (0.61) (1.22) (2.69)
Ethnic fractionaliz. 1.04** 0.82* 1.84*** 1.86** 4.04*** 1.66 3.59*** 1.28
(0.44) (0.49) (0.64) (0.83) (1.29) (3.00) (1.31) (2.46)
Mountainous Terrain 0.01* 0.01** 0.01* 0.04** 0.02 0.12*** 0.02 0.13***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Noncontiguous state 0.76* 0.51 1.52*** 1.59*** 0.64 4.31*** 0.47 3.93**
(0.41) (0.44) (0.49) (0.53) (1.19) (1.33) (1.24) (1.72)
Conflicts coded as war >25 Fat. >1000 Fat. >25 Fat. >1000 Fat. >25 Fat. >1000 Fat. >25 Fat. >1000 Fat. >25 Fat. >1000 Fat. >25 Fat. >1000 Fat.
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample All All All All WVS WVS WVS WVS WVS WVS All All
Observations 1426 1426 1026 939 409 378 101 101 101 101 530 265
Pseudo R-squared 0.304 0.322 0.363 0.358 0.460 0.392 0.575 0.572 0.565 0.544 0.106 0.182
Dependent variable: civil war incidence (five-year intervals). The dependent variable is coded as 1 if a conflict causing at least 25 (1000) fatalities is recorded in at least one of the five
years. Sample period: 1949-2008. Number of countries for which observations are available: 174. The set of controls include the variables listed as well as region fixed effects and time
dummies. Columns 1 to 10 contain logit regressions with robust standard errors, clustered at the country level. Columns 11-12 contain country fixed effects logit regressions. Significance
levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 2: Persistence of civil conicts and correlation between conict and lagged trust (frequency:
ve-years).
while in Table 1 we displayed the marginal e¤ects. Further, Table 2 also displays the coe¢ cients of the
control variables. In addition to these eight rst columns, Table 2 contains four additional columns not
included in Table 1. Columns 9-10 display the same specication without lagged trust as in columns
5-6, but restricting the sample to the same 101 observations as in columns 7-8 where lagged trust is
included. This allows us to see that the change in the magnitude of coe¢ cients of the lagged war
variable between 5-6 and 7-8 is mostly due to the drop in sample size rather than to the change in
specication.
Columns 11-12 display the same specication as in columns 5-6, but including country xed e¤ects
(which leads to a drop of the time invariant controls, ethnic fractionalization, mountainous terrain,
and noncontiguous state).33 We nd that there is still statistically signicant persistence of war, even
when controlling for country xed e¤ects.
Table 3 is the mirror image of Table 2, but displays the point estimates of the variables of interest
and of all controls for the specication where the unit of observation is a country in a given year. After
displaying in columns 1-6 the results on persistence when the lagged trust measure is not included,
the full specication with all controls and lagged trust in columns 7-8 of Table 3 displays the point
estimates corresponding to columns 9-10 of Table 1. In columns 9-10 of Table 3 we display again the
results when running the specication of columns 5-6 on the restricted sample of observations included
in columns 7-8. While, again, most of the change in the lagged war coe¢ cients from 5-6 to 7-8 comes
from the drop in sample size, the inclusion of lagged trust accounts for a substantial additional drop
of the lagged war coe¢ cient in column 8.
Columns 11-12 show that the persistence of war holds up to the inclusion of country xed e¤ects.
33As discussed in the main text, we are not able to include lagged trust in the presence of country xed e¤ects, as
there are only very few countries that have both multiple observations of lagged trust and variation in the war variable
for the periods in which lagged trust is available.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
War (t-1) 4.17*** 4.41*** 3.93*** 4.43*** 4.22*** 4.10*** 5.38*** 1.57 4.98*** 2.38*** 2.66*** 2.68***
(0.18) (0.24) (0.26) (0.31) (0.38) (0.48) (0.85) (1.18) (0.79) (0.69) (0.15) (0.25)
Trust (t-1) -10.85*** -15.44**
(2.40) (6.82)
Democracy (t-1) 0.04* 0.02 0.06** 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.18 0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.13) (0.08) (0.15) (0.02) (0.03)
ln GDP p.c.(t-1) 0.06 -0.24* 0.05 -0.24 0.55 -0.15 -0.19 -1.76*** 0.63** 1.30**
(0.16) (0.12) (0.19) (0.19) (0.36) (1.49) (0.44) (0.59) (0.31) (0.64)
Oil exporter (t-1) 0.14 0.30 0.14 0.78 1.28** 0.25 0.37 0.99 0.91** 2.01**
(0.31) (0.33) (0.42) (0.48) (0.65) (2.23) (0.83) (1.74) (0.44) (0.83)
ln Popul.(t-1) 0.29*** 0.35*** 0.17 0.39*** 0.80*** 2.96** 0.36 1.11*** 1.31 -0.21
(0.10) (0.12) (0.17) (0.15) (0.28) (1.37) (0.28) (0.42) (0.80) (1.59)
Ethnic fractionaliz. 0.27 -0.22 0.07 0.34 1.75* 2.11 0.17 -0.57
(0.46) (0.44) (0.60) (0.80) (1.01) (5.58) (1.39) (1.89)
Mountainous Terrain 1.00** 0.47 1.63** 2.61*** 1.32 15.97 3.22 15.47**
(0.49) (0.80) (0.74) (0.79) (1.78) (10.29) (2.38) (6.75)
Noncontiguous state 0.42 0.18 0.55 0.71* 1.29 4.68 1.37 4.48*
(0.48) (0.51) (0.57) (0.37) (0.79) (2.93) (0.85) (2.42)
Conflicts coded as war >25 Fat. >1000 Fat. >25 Fat. >1000 Fat. >25 Fat. >1000 Fat. >25 Fat. >1000 Fat. >25 Fat. >1000 Fat. >25 Fat. >1000 Fat.
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample All All All All WVS WVS WVS WVS WVS WVS All All
Observations 7613 7613 5222 4808 2707 2248 564 439 564 439 2955 1269
Pseudo R-squared 0.443 0.430 0.502 0.523 0.539 0.523 0.695 0.597 0.652 0.579 0.259 0.337
Dependent variable: civil war incidence (annual observations). The dependent variable is coded as 1 if a conflict causing at least 25 (1000) fatalities is recorded in the year of observation.
Sample period: 1946-2008. Number of countries for which observations are available: 175. The set of controls include the variables listed as well as region fixed effects and time
dummies. Columns 1 to 10 contain logit regressions with robust standard errors, clustered at the country level. Columns 11-12 contain country fixed effects logit regressions. Significance
levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 3: Persistence of civil conicts and correlation between conict and lagged trust (frequency:
annual).
Description of variables used
The dependent variable, civil war incidence, and the main independent variables, lagged war and
lagged trust, have been described above. In what follows we describe the control variables.
Democracy: Polity scores ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic).
From Polity IV (2012).
GDP per capita: PPP adjusted GDP per capita at constant prices. From the Penn World Tables
(Heston et al., 2011).
Oil exporter: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if in a given country and year the fuel exports (in
% of merchandise exports) is above 33%. Variable from Fearon and Laitin (2003), but updated with
recent data of the variable "fuel exports (in % of merchandise exports)" from World Bank (2012).
Population: Total population. From World Bank (2012).
Ethnic Fractionalization: Index of ethnic fractionalization. From Fearon and Laitin (2003).
Mountainous Terrain: Percentage of territory covered by mountains. From Collier et al. (2009).
Noncontiguous State: Dummy taking a value of 1 if a state has noncontiguous territory. From
Fearon and Laitin (2003).
B Additional extensions
This appendix discuss two extensions.
B.1 Low value of war
In the analysis in the text, we have restricted attention to parameters such that the uncivic type always
wages war under BAU. In this appendix we assume, instead, that V  S  (1) < S+ (1), implying
that the uncivic type chooses peace for a region of high beliefs. The new insight is the existence of two
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Figure 5: Surplus from trade and war benets; the case of two traps.
learning traps, one with frequent and one with rare wars. Consider Figure 5. The di¤erence relative
to Figure 1 is that there exists a high range of posterior beliefs, P  ; such that neither types nd
it optimal to wage war. In such a range, the equilibrium is uninformative and peace prevails even
though group A is uncivic.
In this section, we rst outline the results in an intuitive fashion. Then, we present technical
details in section B.1.1.
The equilibrium dynamics continues to be characterized by equations (6),(7) and (8). However,
for a range of prior rt in the left-hand neighborhood of r; the uncivic type is now indi¤erent between
waging war and keeping peace. Then, the (unique) PBE prescribes that an uncivic group A chooses a
strictly mixed strategy under BAU,   2 (0; 1) (see Lemma 2 in section B.1.1). In such a range, the
equilibrium is informative (since + = 1 >  ), but   increases with rt 1; and war/peace becomes
less informative as rt 1 grows. Finally, as r  r; both groups stick to peace and the equilibrium turns
uninformative.
The equilibrium dynamics is represented in Figure 6 (see Proposition 6 in section B.1.1). For
r < r; it is isomorphic to Figure 2. In the interval [r; r]; group A (if uncivic) randomizes between
war and peace. If peace is the outcome of the randomization at t   1, beliefs get stuck to rt+s = r
for all s  0: r is an absorbing state: if the prior beliefs is r; both types retain peace under BAU,
and the posterior belief is also r: The set of priors r > r would also give rise to stationary beliefs, but
it is never reached in equilibrium unless the economy starts in that region. If we dene a peace trap
(TRAP ) to be the mirror image of a war trap, then TRAP = [r;1):
If the initial prior lies in the informative region [r; r], the belief process follows initially the stochas-
tic dynamics given by (6)-(7), converging eventually to either the war or the peace trap. The process
cannot stay forever in the informative region, or, otherwise, agents could observe an innitely large
sample of realizations of the war/peace process, and thus learn the true type of group A, by virtue
of the strong law of large numbers. However, perfect learning would be inconsistent with the beliefs
staying in the informative region, [r; r].
In section B.1.1 (Proposition 7), we provide a formal characterization of the long-run probability
distribution. Intuitively, the economy can get stuck in the "wrong" beliefs with a positive probability.
Namely, it is possible that group A is civic, and yet the economy falls into a war trap after a sequence
of war shocks. Conversely, it is possible that group A is uncivic, and yet the economy falls into a
peace trap after a sequence of peace shocks.
Peace traps dominate in welfare terms the perfect information equilibrium outcome when A is
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Figure 6: Law of motion of beliefs; the case with two traps.
uncivic. They entail fewer wars and more cooperation.34 Interestingly, when A is civic, the best long
run outcome is less e¢ cient than the best long run outcome in the benchmark of a high value of war.
To see why, recall that when the value of war is high, group B can learn (almost) perfectly that group
A is civic, and the allocation converges to the perfect information equilibrium. In contrast, in the
peace trap there is some persistent signal jamming, implying that the likelihood ratio never exceeds r:
Thus, the peace trap features the same (low) probability of war as the perfect information equilibrium
but delivers less trust and cooperation.
B.1.1 Technical analysis
Notation 2 Let r be such that V = S  (r) and let r  P1 W r:
Intuitively, r is the threshold posterior belief such that both types retain peace under BAU if
rP  r: As long as r 1  P1 W r; the posterior can be larger or equal to r:
Remark 1 r < r < r < r:
Given these denitions, the following Lemma can be established.
Lemma 2 Assume V > S+ (0) and V  S  (1) < S+ (1) : For r 1  r the PBE is unique and
uninformative. For r 1 2 [r; r] there are multiple PBE. For r 1 2 [r; r[ the PBE is unique and infor-
mative. For r 1 2 [r; r[ the PBE is unique and informative but involves mixed strategy: + (r 1) = 1
and   (r 1) =
(1 W ) r 1r  P
1 W P : For r 1  r the PBE is unique and uninformative.
Proof. The analysis of the range r 1 < r is identical to the proof of Lemma 1. Therefore, we only
focus here on the range r 1  r:
34Note, though, that group B may su¤er losses in the trade game due to an excessive optimism, which induces its
members to overcooperate vis-a-vis an uncivic group with a high propensity to defect.
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We start by proving that, if we restrict attention to the range r 1  r; an uninformative PBE
exists if and only if r 1  r: To this aim, we rst prove the "if" part: Consider a prior r 1  r:
The posterior rP (r 1) cannot be lower than r 1: Hence rP (r 1)  r, and this implies that V 
S  (rP (r 1)) < S+ (rP (r 1)) : Thus, + (r 1) =   (r 1) = 1, and this in turn means that the PBE
is uninformative with rP (r 1) = r. Second, we prove (by contradiction) the "only if" part: Suppose
that an uninformative PBE exists in such a range. Then, by the denition of uninformative equilibrium,
rP (r 1) = r 1 2 [r; r[, which in turn implies that S+ (rP (r 1)) > V and S  (rP (r 1)) < V: Thus,
+ (r 1) = 1 and   (r 1) = 0; contradicting that the PBE is uninformative.
Next, we prove that a unique informative equilibrium exists in the range r 1 2 [r; r] :We start by
proving that an informative pure-strategy PBE does not exist. Suppose, to derive a contradiction, that
such a PBE exists. The PBE would then feature + (r 1) = 1 and   (r 1) = 0: But, then, Bayes
rule implies that rP (r 1) = 1 WP r 1 > r: This would imply V  S  (rP (r 1)) < S+ (rP (r 1)) and,
thus, + (r 1) =   (r 1) = 1: This would imply a contradiction. As a consequence the PBE must
be a mixed-strategy equilibrium. We guess that the equilibrium has the following form: + (r 1) = 1
(the civic type chooses peace with probability one) and   (r 1) =
(1 W ) r 1r  P
1 W P 2 (0; 1) (the uncivic
type randomizes, choosing peace with probability larger than zero and smaller than one). Bayesrule
implies then that rP (r 1) = r: Since V = S  (r) < S+ (r) ; we have veried the guess by showing
that indeed the civic type strictly prefers peace, whereas the uncivic type is indi¤erent between war
and peace.
The next proposition follows immediately from the selection criterion 3 and from Lemma 2.
Proposition 6 Assume that V > S+ (0) and V  S  (1) < S+ (1). The DSE is characterized as
follows:
The PBE at time t is unique and characterized by Proposition 3 and by the following law of motion:
ln rt =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
ln rt 1 if rt 1 2 [0; r)[]r;1)
ln rt 1 + (1 Wt) ln

1 W
P

 Wt ln

1 P
W

if rt 1 2 [r; r]
(1 Wt) ln r +Wt
h
ln rt 1   ln 1 rt 1(1 W )=rW
i
if rt 1 2 [r; r]
: (23)
If group A is civic (k = +), the probability of war is
P(Wt = 1) =
8<:
1  P if rt 1 2 [0; r[
W if rt 1  r
:
If group A is uncivic (k =  ), the probability of war is
P(Wt = 1) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1  P if rt 1  r
1  (1  W ) r 1r if rt 1 2 [r; r]
W if rt 1 2]r;1]
;
We now characterize the asymptotic dynamics of beliefs in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 V > S+ (0) and V  S  (1) < S+ (1) ; and r0 2 [r; r]. Then, both when k = + and
when k =  , the DSE exits the informative equilibrium regime almost surely, and learning comes to
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a halt in nite time. The nal belief is such that with probability PTRAP > 0 the economy is stuck
in a war trap and with probability 1   PTRAP > 0 it is stuck in a peace trap. The probability has the
following bounds
r
1+r   r01+r0
r
1+r   r1 P
W
+r
< PTRAP 
r
1+r   r01+r0
r
1+r   r1+r
Proof. We apply the same type of argument as in the proof of Proposition 5. Belief t being
a bounded martingale taking values in [0; 1]; the Martingale Convergence Theorem implies that t
converges almost surely to a random variable 1 with a support  1: Clearly, r being an absorbing
state of the dynamics (23), we have:  1 = ~
TRAP [ f r1+rg with ~
TRAP ] r1 P
W
+r
; r1+r ]. Let us
characterize now PTRAP = P[1 2 ~
TRAP ] = 1   P[1 = r1+r ]: Since the belief t is a Martingale,
we have 8t; 0 = E [t] : Taking the limit as t! +1 this leads to
0 = PTRAP  E
h
1 j 1 2 ~
TRAP
i
+ (1  PTRAP ) r
1 + r
(24)
This yields
PTRAP =
r
1+r   0
r
1+r   E
h
1 j 1 2 ~
TRAP
i (25)
We now aim to bound PTRAP in the previous equation. Given that ~
TRAP =] r1 P
W
+r
; r1+r ] we have
r
1 P
W
+ r
< E
h
1 j 1 2 ~
TRAP
i
 r
1 + r
(26)
Combining (25) and (26) and noting that 0 = r01+r0 we obtain
r
1+r   r01+r0
r
1+r   r1 P
W
+r
< PTRAP 
r
1+r   r01+r0
r
1+r   r1+r
We refer the interested reader to the working paper version (Rohner, Dominic, Mathias Thoenig
and Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2011. "War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conict," CEPR Discussion
Papers 8352) where we use analytical tools from stopping time theory. These methods are more
involved but allow us to provide (more accurate) type-dependent bounds P TRAP and P
+
TRAP .
B.2 Altruism and dynamic game
The war decision entails an intergenerational spillover. War depletes trust and harms future gen-
erations in both groups. However, in the analysis in the text, agents have no concern for future
generations, and ignore such a spillover. In this appendix, we consider an extension of the basic model
where the decision to wage war incorporates an altruistic concern towards the next generation.35
Since within-group ine¢ ciencies are ruled out by intra-group transfers, each war can be viewed as
the decision of a single agent (which we label group A planner) in each cohort. Thus, war becomes a
dynamic game between subsequent group A planners. We follow the recent politico-economic literature
(see, e.g., Hassler et al., 2003, and Song et al., 2012), and focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE),
35The goal of this extension is to establish that the results of the benchmark model are robust to intergenerational
altruism, namely, an equilibrium isomorphic to the DSE of section 5 can be sustained when agents are forward-looking.
A characterization of the whole set of equilibria in the new environment is beyond the scope of the analysis.
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in which strategies are conditioned on a vector of payo¤ relevant state variables. In our case, the only
state variable is the state of beliefs.
Consider the following recursive representation of group As value function:
W k(rt 1) = max
k2[0;1]
~W k(k; rt 1); (27)
~W k(k; rt 1) 
h
(1  W   P )k + P
i

h
Sk(rP (rt 1)) + W k(rP (rt 1))
i
(28)
+(1  W   P )(1  k)
h
V + W k(rW (rt 1))
i
+ W 
h
VH + W
k(rW (rt 1))
i
where k 2 f+; g;  2 (0; 1) is an intergenerational discount factor, and Sk is determined as in section
4.
Denition 5 A Markov Perfect Political Equilibrium (MPE) is a pair of functions, h+; i, where
k : [0;1] ! [0; 1] is a "conict rule" such that k (r) = k = argmaxfk2[0;1]g ~W k
 
k; r

where
~W k
 
k; r

is dened as in (27)-(28) and where the dynamics of posterior beliefs are given by
ln rP (r) = ln r + ln
P + (1  W   P ) + (r)
P + (1  W   P )   (r) ; (29)
ln rW (r) = ln r   ln 1  P   (1  W   P ) 
  (r)
1  P   (1  W   P ) + (r) ; (30)
In words, group A makes the current war/peace decision conditional on current beliefs, under
the rational expectation that future decisions to wage war will follow the equilibrium conict rules,
h+; i. Furthermore, the vector of policy functions determined by the optimal choice is a xed
point of the system of functional equations resulting from the constrained maximization in (27). Note
that cooperation in the trade game continues to be determined by a sequence of static decisions, since
individual traders act atomistically.
Proposition 8 Suppose that P

1   V S
 (1)
S (1) S (0) (su¢ cient condition). Then, there exists a MPE
such that, conditional on parameters, the probability of war, the extent of cooperation under peace, and
the equilibrium dynamics of beliefs are identical to those in Proposition 4.
Proof. We proceed by guessing the equilibrium policy (war/peace) function, h+; i ; and then
verifying that the guesses are consistent with the equilibrium. We guess:
  (r) = 0 and + (r) =

0 if r < r
1 if r  r : (31)
We prove that neither group has any incentive to deviate from (31), if future generations follow the
equilibrium policy guessed, (31).
Equation (27) implies that
d ~W k
 
k; rt 1

dk
= (1  W   P )
h
Sk(rP (rt 1))  V +  

W k(rP (rt 1)) W k(rW (rt 1))
i
(32)
Consider, rst, the range r < r; where k (r) = 0 for both types. Substituting the guess, (31), into
(29)-(30) yields rP (rt 1) = rW (rt 1) = rt 1: Thus, the sign of d ~W k( ; rt 1)=dk is determined by
the sign of Sk(rt 1)  V , which is negative for both k 2 f+; g: This implies that the optimal choice
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is k(rt 1) = 0 = k (r) for both k: This proves that neither type faces a protable deviation from
the guessed policy rule, (31), in the range r < r:
Next, we move to the range r  r. Consider the civic type: we claim that d ~W+( ; rt 1)=d+ > 0,
since S+(rP (rt 1)  V; andW+ (rP (rt 1)) > W+ (rW (rt 1)). Thus, the optimal choice is +(rt 1) =
1 = + (r). This proves that there is no protable deviation from (31) for the civic type in the range
r  r: Consider, next, the uncivic type: the sign of d ~W ( ; rt 1)=d  is in general ambiguous, since
S (rP (rt 1) < V; and W  (rP (rt 1)) > W  (rW (rt 1)). We now prove that under the parameter
restriction of Proposition 8, the rst term dominates, and d ~W ( ; rt 1)=d  < 0: From (32), this is
the case if and only if
   W (rP (rt 1)) W (rW (rt 1)) < V   S (rP (rt 1)) (33)
First, note that V   S (1) is a lower bound to the right hand side of (33). Second, note that
  (W (1) W (0)) is an upper bound to the left hand side of (33), since W is increasing in r:
Therefore, the following condition is su¢ cient to ensure that d ~W ( ; rt 1)=d  < 0:
   W  (1) W  (0) < V   S (1) (34)
Given that, under the proposed policy rule (  = 0), W  (1) = P1 S  (1) + 1 P W1  V + W1 VH
and W  (0) = P1 S
  (0) + 1 P W1  V +
W
1 VH ; the su¢ cient condition (34) can be rewritten as
P
1   
V   S  (1)
S  (1)  S  (0) ;
which is the condition given in the statement of the Proposition. Under this su¢ cient condition,
 (rt 1) = 0 =   (r) ; so the uncivic type faces no protable deviation from the guessed policy rule
 : This concludes the proof of the Proposition.
The intuition of the proof is the following. When the economy is in the war trap there is no
learning, hence, no intergenerational spillover. Thus, the optimal war/peace decision is not a¤ected by
altruism. In the informative region, however, there is an intergenerational spillover, and the altruistic
concern can induce the uncivic to mimic the civic type and keep peace under BAU in order to increase
trust and cooperation during future peace spells. The su¢ cient condition of Proposition 8 rules out
that such a mimicking deviation is protable. In particular, it guarantees that V   S (rP (r)) >
 (W  (rP (r)) W  (rW (r))) ; i.e., the static gain from waging war over retaining peace exceeds the
discounted di¤erence between the continuation values after peace and war, respectively. Intuitively, a
low  reduces the scope of a one-period deviation since the benets of the deviation accrue to future
generations. The probability of peace shocks, P ; also matters, since along the equilibrium path (after
the deviation), an uncivic group A will only retain peace when peace shocks arise. It is therefore only
under peace shocks that trade and beliefs matter for future generations. Hence, frequent peace shocks
make it harder, ceteris paribus, to sustain the equilibrium of Proposition 8.
C Technical details of the analysis in the main text
C.1 Analysis of Section 3.1 (welfare analysis)
Consider two planners who are entrusted to choose which agents cooperate and which defect. Each
planner maximizes the sum of the trade surplus of its own group. Note that the pay-o¤ includes the
taste for cooperation, or its opposite, i.e., the dislike of some individuals for cooperation with the
other group. We consider two cases. In the rst, the two planners play a Nash game, i.e., they decide
taking the behavior of the other group as given. In the second, they cooperate so as to maximizes the
sum of the welfare of the two groups (economy-wide level e¢ ciency).
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In all cases, the planners ask more cooperative players (high Pi) to cooperate, and, possibly, some
less cooperative players (low Pi) to defect. Thus, the planners will adopt a threshold rule. We shall
denote by PkA and PkB; respectively, the threshold agent in group A and group B conditional on the
group As type being k 2 f+; g:
It is useful to recall here the notation introduced in the text:
Notation 3 Let (i) z  c (d  l); (ii) Li  l P i; (iii) fJ(L)  hJ(l L) and F J(L)  1 HJ(l L),
with J 2 f+; ; Bg:
C.1.1 Nash equilibrium between group planners
The Nash planner of group A chooses PkA in order to maximize Sk; taking as given the proportion
nkB  FB
 
LkB

of cooperators in group B. Sk is dened as
Sk 
Z PkA
 1
d dHk (P) +
Z 1
PkA

nkB (c+ Pi) +

1  nkB

(d  l + Pi)

dHk (P)
= d
Z PkA
 1
dHk (P) +
Z 1
PkA

nkB (c  (d  l)) + (d  l) + Pi

dHk (P)
= d+
Z 1
PkA

nkBz + (Pi   l)

dHk (P)
The maximization with respect to PkA yields
max
Pk
Z 1
PkA

nkBz + (Pi   l)

dHk (P)) znkB = l   PkA
Using the denition nkB = F
B
 
LkB

we get
LkA=zFB( LkB) (35)
The same argument leads one to conclude that the planner of group B chooses
LkB=zF k( LkA) (36)
Using again the denitions of nkA and n
k
B the rst order conditions (35) and (36) give
nkA = F
k(nkB)
nkB = F
B(nkA)
We conclude that the allocation chosen by the Nash planners is identical to the decentralized equilib-
rium.
C.1.2 Cooperative solution (economy-wide rst best)
The e¢ cient solution maximizes
Sk + SB 
Z PkA
 1
d dHk (P) +
Z 1
PkA

nkB (c+ Pi) +

1  nkB

(d  l + Pi)

dHk (P) +
Z PkB
 1
d dHk (P) +
Z 1
PkB

nkA (c+ Pi) +

1  nkA

(d  l + Pi)

dHk (P) +
= 2d+
Z 1
PkA

nkBz + (Pi   l)

dHk (P) +
Z 1
PkB

nkAz + (Pi   l)

dHB (P) ;
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where nkA = H
k
 
PkA

and nkB = H
B
 
PkB

: Plugging in the expressions of nkA and n
k
B yields
Sk + SB  2d+
Z 1
PkA

zHB

PkB

+ (Pi   l)

dHk (P) +
Z 1
PkB

zHk

PkA

+ (Pi   l)

dHB (P)
Taking FOCs yields
d
 
Sk + SB

d PkA
= 0)
zHB

PkB

+

PkA   l

+ zhk

PkA
Z 1
PkB
dHB (P) = 0)
zHB

PkB

+

PkA   l

+ zhk

PkA

HB

PkB

= 0)
znkB

1 + hk

PkA

= l   PkA
d
 
Sk + SB

d PkB
= 0)
zHB

PkA

+

PkB   l

+ zhB

PkB
Z 1
PkA
dHk (P) = 0)
zHB

PkA

+

PkB   l

+ zhB

PkB

Hk

PkA

= 0)
znkA

1 + hB

PkB

= l   PkB
Using the notation conventions above, this yields:
LkA = zFB( LkB)

1 + fB

LkA

(37)
LkB = zF k( LkA)

1 + fk

LkB

(38)
Comparing (35)-(36) to (37)-(38) we note the presence of two new terms relative to the Nash
equilibrium above. These terms reect the cross-group spillover. In general, both groups gain from
additional investment relative to the laissez-faire equilibrium.
A particular transparent case is one in which P is drawn from uniform (type- and group-specic)
distributions. Then (37)-(38) lead to
znkB
 
1 + fB

= LkA ) nkA = F k

znkB
 
1 + fB

;
znkA

1 + fk

= LkB ) nkB = FB

znkB

1 + fk

:
Then,
Sk = d+ z 

nkA  nkB

 
Z znkB
 1
LdF k (L) > Sk;
SBk = d+ z 

nkA  nkB

 
Z znkA
 1
LdF k (L) > SBk:
We have therefore shown that the trade game underprovides cooperation relative to the rst best.
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C.2 Analysis of Section 6.1 (stochastic types)
In this section, we provide the details of the analysis in Section 6.1. The type shock is realized at the
beginning of each period, before group A decides whether to go to war. We continue to denote by
rt 1 the posterior belief (likelihood ratio) that group A is of the good type after the realization of
war/peace in time t  1: However, this is now di¤erent from the prior belief at t, which drives war and
trade decisions, due to the mean reversion induced by (14). We denoted by ~ such a prior, and by ~r
the corresponding likelihood ratio. Bayes rule yields ~ (t 1) = (1   )t 1 +  (1  t 1), hence,
~r (rt 1) =
(1   )rt 1 + 
 rt 1 + 1   : (39)
Thus, the posterior likelihood ratio after war and peace are, respectively,
ln rP (rt 1) = ln ~r (rt 1) + ln
P + (1  W   P )+ (~r (rt 1))
P + (1  W   P )  (~r (rt 1)) ; (40)
ln rW (rt 1) = ln ~r (rt 1)  ln 1  P   (1  W   P )
  (~r (rt 1))
1  P   (1  W   P )+ (~r (rt 1)) :
The Bayesian updating process is described by the system (39)(40).
In the region of uninformative PBE (i.e., ~r (rt 1)  r),   (~r (rt 1)) = + (~r (rt 1)) = 0. Thus,
rP = rW = ~r (rt 1) ; and the dynamics are governed by the following ordinary di¤erence equation (see
ODE in (16)),
rt = ~r (rt 1) =
(1   )rt 1 + 
 rt 1 + 1   : (41)
In the uninformative region, group A always wages war under BAU. The unconditional likelihood ratio
that A is civic, r^  = ; is the unique rest point of (41): r^  ~r (r^) ; with r^ > 0.
In the region of informative PBE (i.e., ~r (rt 1) > r),   (~r (rt 1)) = 0 and + (~r (rt 1)) = 1, and
the dynamics are governed by the stochastic di¤erence equation (see StoDE in (16))
rt =
8><>:
~r (rt 1) 1 WP if Wt = 0
~r (rt 1) W1 P if Wt = 1
(42)
In this region, group A wages war under BAU when it is of the uncivic type and retains peace under
BAU when it is of the civic type. We dene r^+ > 0 and r^  > 0 to be, respectively, the upper
and lower bound of the ergodic set induced by the stochastic equation (42): r^+ = ~r (r^+) 1 WP and
r^  = ~r (r^ ) W1 P : Intuitively, r^+ (r^ ) corresponds to the "quasi-steady state" to which beliefs would
converge after an innite sequence of peace (war) observations. The equations r^+ = ~r (r^+)  1 WP
and r^  = ~r (r^ ) W1 P are polynomials of the second degree. They admit the following roots:
r^+ =

1  W
P
(1   )  (1  )

=2 
 1
2 
s
1  W
P
(1   )  (1  )
2
+ 4
1  W
P
 
r^  =

W
1  P (1   )  (1  )

=2 
 1
2 
s
W
1  P (1   )  (1  )
2
+ 4
W
1  P 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for k 2 f+; g: The smaller roots are always negative and can therefore be discarded. As a consequence
r^  and r^+ are uniquely dened, and r^  < r^ < r^+.
Note that neither r^+ nor r^  nor r^ depend on V: Since r  P (S+) 1 (V ) =(1  W ); it is possible
to choose V (or, alternatively, = ) consistent with each of the three cases analyzed in text, r > r^;
r 2 [r^ ; r^] and r < r^ :
C.3 Analysis of Section 6.2 (learning from trade)
We start by a general characterization of the PBE in the environment of Section 6.2.
Proposition 9 For any (rP ; ) 2 [0;+1)  [0; 1] ; the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the trade
game exists and is unique. It is characterized by the 4-tuple fn A; n+A; n B; n+Bg 2 [0; 1]4 such that, for
k 2 f+; g;
nkA = F
k(znkB) and n
k
B = G
k
 
zn+B; zn
 
B

; (43)
where Gk
 
zn+B; zn
 
B
  FB(zF k(znkB)) + (1  )FB h rP1+rP zF+(zn+B) + 11+rP zF (zn B)i : The equilib-
rium trade surplus accruing to group A, Sk (rP ; ) ; is given by
Sk (rP ; ) = d+
Z znB(rP ;)
 1
F k (L) dL:
Proof. First, we derive (43). Suppose k = +: Then, all informed agents in B such that P i  zn+A
will cooperate. Likewise, all agents in A such that P i  zn+B will cooperate. However, some agents
in B are uninformed, and agents in A know it. An uninformed player in B will cooperate as long
as P i  P  zF+(zn+A) + (1  P )  zF (zn A): As this inequality shows, in order to determine
the behavior of the uninformed players, we must solve for the counterfactual distribution n A; which
in turn requires that we solve for n B: More formally, if k =  ; all informed agents in B such that
P i  zn A would cooperate, and all agents in A such that P i  zn B will cooperate. And so on.
Thus, the complete system yields
n+A = F
+(zn+B);
n A = F
 (zn B);
n+B = F
B(zF k(zn+B)) + (1  )FB

rP
1 + rP
zn+A +
1
1 + rP
zn A

;
n B = F
B(zF k(zn B)) + (1  )FB

rP
1 + rP
zn+A +
1
1 + rP
zn A

;
which is equivalent, after substituting the expressions of n+A and n
 
A into the third and fourth equality,
to (43).
Given (rP ; ) 2 [0;+1)  [0; 1] ; the system of equations (43) denes a continuous mapping
G :[0; 1]4 ! [0; 1]4 such that  n A; n+A; n B; n+B = G  n A; n+A; n B; n+B : Brouwers xed point theorem
implies that G has at least one xed point.
Let G^  fG+; G g : [0; 1]2 ! [0; 1]2 denote the third and fourth equation of (43),  n B; n+B =
G
 
n B; n
+
B

: Note that this sub-xed-point problem can be solved without reference to nkA: Brouwers
xed point theorem implies that G^ has also at least one xed point. Moreover, the xed point is
unique, since G^
 
n B; n
+
B

is a continuous, (weakly) monotonically increasing, convex mapping. This
follows, in turn, from FB; F+ and F  being continuous non-decreasing convex functions. From the
uniqueness of (n B (rP ; ) ; n
+
B (rP ; )) it follows immediately that (n
 
A (rP ; ) ; n
+
A (rP ; )) is also unique,
establishing that the xed point
 
n A; n
+
A; n
 
B; n
+
B

= G
 
n A; n
+
An
 
B; n
+
B

is unique.
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The derivation of the expression for the trade surplus is as in the proof of Proposition 2. QED
In the rest of this section, we specialize the analysis to uniform distributions of psychological costs
and benets of cooperation, as discussed in the text.
Assumption 4 F+  [ x; 1], F   [0; 1 + x], FB  [0; 1] with x  0:
Remark 2 Assumption 4 is consistent with Assumption 1 if and only if z  1.
In the rest of the section, we also focus on the particular case in which z = 1, and normalize the
payo¤ matrix so that d = 0: These assumptions entail no loss of generality and are only aimed at
obtaining simple algebraic expressions. The generalization to z  1 and d 6= 0 is straightforward, if
more cumbersome. Note that, under perfect information, z = 1 implies that the Nash equilibrium
features
 
n A; n
 
B

= (0; 0) and
 
n+A; n
+
B

= (1; 1) [note that this is no corner solution, i.e., for any
z < 1 the solution is strictly in the interior of [0; 1]2].
Under these distributional and parametric restrictions, we can provide a closed form solution of
the PBE in Proposition 9.
Corollary 2 Under Assumption 4, and the (algebra-simplifying) assumptions that z = 1 and d = 0;
the PBE has the following characterization
n B (rP ; ) =
rP
1 + rP

1  x
1  + x

;
n+B (rP ; ) =
rP
1 + rP

1 +
x
1  + x

+
x
1+x
   1
;
n A (rP ; ) =
n B (rP ; )
1 + x
;
n+A (rP ; ) =
n+B (rP ; ) + x
1 + x
;
S+ (rP ; ) =
[n+B(rP ; ) + x]
2
2(1 + x)
;
S  (rP ; ) =
[n B(rP ; )]
2
2(1 + x)
:
Note that (i) all expressions are increasing in rP ; (ii) n
+
B (rP ; ) and n
+
A (rP ; ) (respectively, n
 
B (rP ; )
and n A (rP ; )) are increasing (respectively, decreasing) in ; (iii) S
+ (rP ; ) is increasing in  and
S  (rP ; ) is decreasing in :
Proof. The Corollary follows from Proposition 9, after standard algebra. QED
Consider next the dynamics of : We establish an upper bound to the proportion of informed
agents.
Lemma 3 Let 1 () 

1 + (1 )
 1
: Assume 0 < 1 () : Then, for any t 2 [0;1) and any
realization of the war/peace process, t < 1 () =

1 + (1 )
 1
:
Proof. The lemma follows from (18), after setting Wt = 0 for all t: QED
The upper bound 1 () corresponds to the proportion of informed agents accumulated after an
innite sequence of peace shocks. Note that 1 () is decreasing in  and increasing in  : Moreover,
1(0) = 1 and 1(1) = 0: The model of this section nests the benchmark model in the particular case
in which  = 1 (or  = 0).
Next, we turn to the denition of war traps.
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Denition 6 A war trap is a set of states, 
TRAP  R+  [0; 1]; such that if (rt; t) 2 
TRAP then
8s  t; rs = rt for all continuation paths [rs; s]1s=t :
Note that we do not require the stationarity of t for an economy to be in a war trap. The test
for the existence of a trap is that, for a non-empty set of beliefs, both types follow the same strategy
(i.e., either wage war or retain peace) under BAU, when the number of informed agents is at its upper
bound. Moreover, this must remain true for any subsequent sequence of war and peace shocks.
We continue to focus on the region of the parameter space such that, absent learning from trade
(e.g., when  = 1), V > S+(0) and S  (1) < V < S+ (1) ; which are the conditions of Propositions
4 and 5. Combined with the Corollary 2 this translates into
V >
x2
2(1 + x)
and x > 1 (44)
The following Lemma and Proposition establish that (i)  must be su¢ ciently large for a war trap
to be sustained i.e., a su¢ ciently large friction in the information transmission is crucial for the war
trap to be robust; (ii) the size for the war trap depends on :
Lemma 4 Suppose condition (44) holds. Then, under the conditions of Corollary 2, 
TRAP 6= ? if
and only if 1 >  > W  [[1 + 1+xx ((
p
2(1 + x)V   x) 1   1] 1] 1:
Proof. Using the expressions in Corollary 2, we obtain that S+ (0; 1 ()) = 12
(1+x)x2
(1+x 1())2 ; where
S+ is increasing in 1; and 1 is decreasing in : In particular, S+ (0; 1 (W )) = V: (i) Suppose
 < W : Then, S+ (0; 1 ()) > S+ (0; 1 (W )) = V: Hence,  < W implies that 
TRAP = ?: (ii)
Suppose that  > W : Then, the same argument implies that S+ (0; 1 ()) < S+ (0; 1 (W )) = V:
But, then, for any such ; there exists r^ > 0; such that S+ (r^; 1 ()) < V: Hence,  > W implies that

TRAP 6= ?: Finally, the case of  = W is degenerate, as in this case a trap exists only as long as
r = 0:
Proposition 10 Suppose condition (44) holds and   W . Then, under the conditions of Corollary
2, an economy is in a war trap if and only r < r ()  P r () =(1  W ); where
r () 
p
2(1 + x)V   x  11+(1+x)=x(1 )
1 p2(1 + x)V + x ; (45)
and r () is an increasing function of :
Proof. For a given ; the upper bound of 
TRAP is denoted rP = r () ; characterized by
S+ (r () ; 1()) = V:
Using the expression of S+ (r; ) given by Corollary 2 and the expression of 1 () given by Lemma 3,
and simplifying terms, yields (45). The assumption that 1 >   W ensures that r () > 0: Standard
algebra establishes that r () ; and, hence, r () ; is an increasing function of : QED
C.4 Analysis of Section 6.3 (three groups)
In this section, we extend the analysis to an environment in which the economy is inhabited by three
groups: A, B and C. We focus on the trade links between A and B, and between A and C, and on
how the presence of a third group (C) a¤ects the probability that A attacks B.
Let E[ykBi (rP )]  d denote the expected payo¤to agent i in group A who is randomly matched with
an agent belonging to group B, and who plays the strategy (either cooperate or defect) that maximizes
15
the expected payo¤ in the trade game described by the payo¤ matrix 1. Note that, irrespective of
beliefs E[ykBi (rP )]  d; since an agent can always choose to defect and earn the safe payo¤ d. In
the benchmark model, the trade surplus accruing to A under peace can be expressed as Sk (rP ) =R
i E[y
kB
i (rP )].
Each agent in A can choose how much time to spend trading with a partner in B and how much
trading with a partner in C. Let  be the fraction of time endowment trader i in group A spends
trading with the randomly matched partner in group B. War implies that  i = 0 for all is.
Let us focus on two alternative polar opposite cases (substitution and complementarity):
Case 1 (substitution) yi =  i  yBi + (1   i) yC
Case 2 (complementarity) yi = minf i; 1   ig  yBi +minf1   i;  ig  yC
In the case of substitution, trade with B and C are completely independent activities. In this
case yC simply denotes the productivity of (full-time) trade with any agent of group C. In the case of
complementarity, there are spillovers across trade activities. The pay-o¤ from trading with B requires
time spent with C, and the pay-o¤ from trading with C requires time spent with B. In this case, the
maximum trade o¤ from trade with group C is yC=2:
Assumption 5 yC < d:
C.4.1 The case of substitution
Assumption 5 implies that, in this case, trading with B is strictly preferred to trading with C. Thus,
all agents in A choose  = 1 in peacetime. So Sk (rP ) =
R
i E[y
kB
i (rP )]: In wartime, all agents must
trade full time with C, i.e.,  = 1: Thus, SWAR = yC ; where SWAR denotes the trade surplus during
wartime. The di¤erence between Sk (rP ) and SWAR is the opportunity cost of war, and determines
the size of the trap. War is chosen under BAU whenever
V + yC > Sk (rP ) :
Proposition 11 Given k 2 f+; g; in the case of substitution, the range of beliefs such that group A
chooses war under BAU is an increasing function of the productivity of the trade link, yC :
Note that yC = 0 is equivalent to the model with only two groups, which yields the lowest
probability of war.
C.4.2 The case of complementarity
In this, under peace, each agent chooses  = 1=2: This yields Sk (rP ) = 12
 R
i E[y
kB
i (rP )] + y
C

: Under
war,  = 1 and thus SWAR = 0: Note that group B provides services that have both some intrinsic
value, and increase the productivity of trade with C. Destroying trade with B also destroys the surplus
from trading with C. War is chosen under BAU whenever
V >
1
2
Z
i
E[ykBi (rP )] + yC

:
In this case, war becomes less likely as yC increases.
Proposition 12 Given k 2 f+; g; in the case of complementarity, increasing yC reduces the size of
the war trap.
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